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CHEVRONIZING AROUND  
COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 
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ABSTRACT 
  The Trump administration’s efforts to weaken regulations were in 
tension with cost-benefit analysis, which in many cases supported those 
regulations or otherwise failed to support the administration’s 
deregulatory objectives. Rather than attempting to justify its actions as 
a matter of policy preferences, the administration responded on 
multiple occasions by using Chevron to interpret statutes so as to evade 
cost-benefit analysis. The statutory interpretation route, which we call 
“Chevronizing” around cost-benefit analysis, created novel challenges 
for courts, as it pitted traditional Chevron deference against a trend in 
favor of requiring agencies to regulate based on cost-benefit analysis as 
a matter of sound public policy. This Article evaluates these efforts and 
concludes that in many of these cases, the Trump administration’s 
attempts to leverage Chevron deference as a weapon against cost-
benefit analysis—and sensible policymaking—exposed it to significant 
legal risk. We expect that courts will reject several of these efforts if they 
are ever adjudicated. In the process, the Trump administration’s 
machinations may have had the effect of contorting how future courts 
apply Chevron deference and how future administrations deploy it. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Trump administration launched the most significant effort to 
deregulate the economy since the Reagan administration.1 The 
parallels between the two administrations are significant, but there are 
many differences as well. Ronald Reagan ran for office on a promise 
to deregulate the economy, but he also benefited from political 
tailwinds.2 A bipartisan consensus held that the economy was 
overregulated, and major deregulatory legislation had already been 
enacted during the Carter administration.3 Once in office, Reagan 
appointed antiregulatory officials to regulatory agencies, and, working 
through the Office of Management and Budget, strengthened the 
White House’s control over those agencies.4 His most significant 
 
 1. See David R. Henderson, Trump’s Deregulatory Successes, HOOVER INST., DEFINING 
IDEAS (July 7, 2019), https://www.hoover.org/research/trumps-deregulatory-successes [https://
perma.cc/6Z63-8S5R] (discussing, from the perspective of a former economist with President 
Ronald Reagan’s Council of Economic Advisers, several of the Trump administration’s 
deregulatory efforts). But see Roundup: Trump-Era Agency Policy in the Courts, INST. FOR POL’Y 
INTEGRITY (last updated Jan. 4, 2021), https://policyintegrity.org/trump-court-roundup 
[https://perma.cc/VJH8-AKDP] (observing that the Trump administration lost 81.6 percent of 
litigation over deregulation).  
 2. HENRY OLSEN, THE WORKING CLASS REPUBLICAN: RONALD REAGAN AND THE 
RETURN OF BLUE-COLLAR CONSERVATISM 190 (2017). 
 3. See John Howard Brown, Jimmy Carter, Alfred Kahn, and Airline Deregulation: 
Anatomy of a Policy Success, 19 INDEP. REV. 85, 91–92 (2014) (noting how the Airline 
Deregulation Act, which was signed by President Jimmy Carter in 1987, was sponsored by both 
Senator Howard Cannon (D-Nev.) and Senator James B. Pearson (R-Kan.) and supported by 
Democrats and Republicans in both houses); Abner J. Mikva, Deregulating Through the Back 
Door: The Hard Way To Fight a Revolution, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 521, 524 (1990) (“While the 
Republicans had a head start and a better public image on the issue of deregulation, Democrats 
strived to catch up. By the 1976 election, Jimmy Carter was on the offensive about deregulation, 
talking of sunset provisions . . . and zero-based budgeting . . . .”).  
 4. See Jim Tozzi, OIRA’s Formative Years: The Historical Record of Centralized Regulatory 
Review Preceding OIRA’s Founding, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 37, 63–67 (2011) (noting how Reagan 
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achievement was the creation of centralized regulatory review that 
required agencies to use cost-benefit analysis (“CBA”) to evaluate 
regulatory options.5 Agencies were required to conduct cost-benefit 
analyses of all major (in the sense of economically important) 
regulations,6 which would permit the administration to evaluate 
whether the regulation was worth pursuing. The genius of this move 
was that cost-benefit analysis appeared to be a neutral tool of policy 
analysis but seemed likely to produce a deregulatory effect because it 
was widely believed, by people in both parties, that agencies regulated 
excessively.7 
 
administration officials created the first executive order freezing government regulations that had 
not gone into effect and established numerous antiregulatory policies, including requiring the 
Office of Management and Budget (“OMB”) and other White House departments to review 
proposed agency regulations); see also Edward P. Fuchs & James E. Anderson, The 
Institutionalization of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 10 PUB. PRODUCTIVITY REV. 25, 30–32 (1987) 
(describing the regulatory review agencies Reagan created, which were composed of White 
House officials); Andrew Rudalevige, Beyond Structure and Process: The Early 
Institutionalization of Regulatory Review, 30 J. POL. HIST. 577, 588–89 (2018) (describing the 
creation of Reagan’s Presidential Task Force of Regulatory Relief and the administration’s 
requirement that agencies submit proposed and final drafts of regulations to the OMB for 
approval). These deregulatory efforts were not always well received. See Martin Tolchin & Susan 
J. Tolchin, The Rush To Deregulate, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 21, 1983), https://nyti.ms/29JRS2n [https://
perma.cc/U4FX-N3G9] (describing congressional and public criticism of certain Reagan 
administration deregulatory efforts).  
 5. See Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. § 127 (1982) (requiring that agencies conduct 
“Regulatory Impact Analysis” and report findings to the director of the OMB). For a scholarly 
assessment of Reagan’s regulatory executive orders, see generally Frank B. Cross, Executive 
Orders 12,291 and 12,498: A Test Case in Presidential Control of Executive Agencies, 4 J.L. & POL. 
483 (1988); see also Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2279 
(2001) (concluding the Reagan and Clinton administrations’ influence over the regulatory process 
was largely beneficial).  
 6. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. § 127. 
 7. See Jefferson Decker, Deregulation, Reagan-style, REGUL. REV. (Mar. 13, 2019), https://
www.theregreview.org/2019/03/13/decker-deregulation-reagan-style [https://perma.cc/HFM6-
VKG7] (“By the late 1970s, a political and intellectual movement that crossed party lines had 
begun to rethink the wisdom of much economic regulation . . . . The bipartisan movement 
succeeded in federal deregulation of certain industries . . . .”). As Senator Ted Kennedy (D-Mass.) 
once said, “regulators all too often encourage or approve imreasonably [sic] high prices, 
inadequate service, and anticompetitive behavior. The cost of this regulation is always passed on 
to the consumer. And that cost is astronomical.” Oversight of Civil Aeronautics Board Practices 
and Procedure: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Prac. & Proc. of the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 94th Cong. 1 (1975) (statement of Sen. Edward Kennedy, Chairman, S. Subcomm. on 
Admin. Prac. & Proc.).  
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But while cost-benefit analysis remained in place through the next 
four presidential administrations,8 it exerted less deregulatory pressure 
after Reagan left office.9 It is possible that subsequent presidents put 
less priority on deregulation; that regulations that survived the 
Reagan-era housecleaning satisfied cost-benefit tests; and that, as new 
problems emerged, from climate change to financial instability, it 
turned out that additional regulation was cost-justified. Although 
deregulation would continue in some sectors, new regulations were 
found necessary in others.10  
In the years leading up to Donald Trump’s electoral victory, 
regulated industries expressed frustration with regulatory 
developments, including financial regulation in the wake of the 
financial crisis,11 environmental and energy regulation in response to 
climate change,12 and health care regulation pursuant to the Affordable 
Care Act.13 Candidate Trump promised to deregulate, and once in 
office, he initiated a deregulatory agenda.14 
But in a major irony from the standpoint of the Reagan era, cost-
benefit analysis now seems to be a hindrance to deregulation. The 
deregulations that the Trump administration proposed appear to 
 
 8. Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Unquantified Benefits and Regulation Under 
Uncertainty, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 87, 96 (2016) (noting how each president since Reagan 
“extended Reagan’s [executive order requiring cost-benefit analysis] with some modifications”). 
 9. MATTHEW D. ADLER & ERIC A. POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS OF COST-BENEFIT 
ANALYSIS 3–4 (2006). 
 10. Masur & Posner, supra note 8,  at 128–33 (discussing an Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission’s accessibility regulation and an Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) 
regulation of coal- and oil-fired power plants).  
 11. See, e.g., Randall D. Guynn, The Financial Panic of 2008 and Financial Regulatory 
Reform, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Nov. 20, 2010), https://
corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2010/11/20/the-financial-panic-of-2008-and-financial-regulatory-reform 
[https://perma.cc/C7EK-BTNW] (“Critics on the right argued that [the Dodd-Frank Act] 
amounted to a vast expansion of Government control over the financial sector without addressing 
the real causes of the financial panic . . . .”).  
 12. See, e.g., Press Release, Senate Comm. on Energy & Nat. Res., Sen. Murkowski 
Expresses Frustration with New ECA Regulations (July 27, 2012), https://
www.energy.senate.gov/2012/7/sen-murkowski-expresses-frustration-with-new-eca-regulations 
[https://perma.cc/N8M5-VV9B] (opposing the EPA’s Emission Control Area requirements that 
decreased the allowable percentage of sulfur for ship fuel, thus making fuel more expensive).  
 13. See, e.g., Amy Anderson, The Impact of the Affordable Care Act on the Health Care 
Workforce, HERITAGE FOUND. (Mar. 18, 2014), https://www.heritage.org/health-care-reform/
report/the-impact-the-affordable-care-act-the-health-care-workforce [https://perma.cc/PBR2-
LKNT].  
 14. See John Stossel, Trump’s Deregulation Promise, DAILY SIGNAL (Aug. 22, 2019), https://
www.dailysignal.com/2019/08/22/trumps-deregulation-promise [https://perma.cc/5AJA-7F3W]. 
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violate cost-benefit analysis—primarily because the Obama-era 
regulations that the Trump administration sought to repeal are backed 
by plausible cost-benefit analyses.15 This represents a startling shift 
from the role that cost-benefit analysis has typically played, and one 
that runs directly counter to the caricatured notion of cost-benefit 
analysis as necessarily antiregulatory.16 
On previous occasions, when a new presidential administration 
has decided to alter or undo the regulations promulgated by its 
predecessors, the new administration has simply announced that it has 
different policy priorities.17 But here, the cost-benefit infirmities of 
Trump’s deregulations seem to have changed the equation. Whether 
due to the political cost of deregulating in a cost-benefit unjustified 
manner, or due to concern that the regulations would be struck down 
by the courts, the Trump administration did not appear willing to bite 
the bullet and acknowledge that it chose policies that fail cost-benefit 
analysis. Instead, it responded in several different ways. In a few cases, 
it simply proposed implausible cost-benefit analyses that do not survive 
serious scrutiny. But its most important innovation was to argue, in 
several important instances, that deregulation is not merely a policy 
choice but is also legally required by the underlying regulatory statute. 
This approach involved the manipulation of Chevron18 deference—
under which agencies have discretionary authority to set policy when 
statutes are vague19—to deprive agencies of the power to consider 
 
 15. Conversely, a 2019 Council of Economic Advisers report claimed that “the Trump 
Administration’s new regulatory approach” had and would generate massive gains for the public. 
COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISORS, THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF FEDERAL DEREGULATION SINCE 
JANUARY 2017: AN INTERIM REPORT 2 (2019). We are skeptical of this claim, which was based 
on a small number of regulatory actions—supposedly representative of all Trump administration 
regulations—as well as statutes and other actions outside the scope of this Article. See id. at 4–6. 
But in any event the Report did not discuss any of the deregulatory actions we address in this 
Article, and so our conclusions are not inconsistent with any of the specific claims that the Report 
attempted to document. 
 16. See, e.g., FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE 
PRICE OF EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING 41–47 (2004). 
 17. See, e.g., Michael Grunwald, The Nation He Built, POLITICO (Jan.–Feb. 2016), https://
www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/01/obama-biggest-achievements-213487 [https://perma. 
cc/9P8U-5T8Q] (noting that Obama “promised dramatic policy change, vowing to reinvent 
America’s approach to issues like health care, education, energy, climate and finance”); see also 
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 59 (1983) (Rehnquist, 
C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“A change in administration brought about by the 
people casting their votes is a perfectly reasonable basis for an executive agency’s reappraisal of 
the costs and benefits of its programs and regulations.”). 
 18. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 19. Id. at 842–44. 
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certain benefits generated by regulations. We refer to this tactic as 
“Chevronizing around cost-benefit analysis.” 
In the balance of this Article, we discuss the Trump 
administration’s deregulatory approach, with a focus on Chevronizing 
around cost-benefit analysis. In Part I, we describe four of the Trump 
administration’s most significant deregulatory efforts and illustrate the 
various tactics used to justify them. In Part II, we evaluate these 
methods, assess their legality, and discuss possible policy justifications 
for the Trump administration’s approach. We conclude that the Trump 
administration’s approach—and in particular, its efforts to Chevronize 
around CBA—is suspect from the standpoint of law and policy. 
I.  TRUMP’S MAJOR DEREGULATIONS 
After he took office, Trump sought to roll back many of the 
regulatory actions undertaken by the Obama administration. This 
deregulatory effort primarily involved notice-and-comment 
rulemaking by administrative agencies that either reversed Obama-era 
regulations or replaced them with substantially weaker rules.20 Most of 
this activity involved the environmental and power sectors.21 This 
included Obama-era rules on automobile fuel economy, hazardous 
pollutants, energy efficiency, and—most notably—the Clean Power 
Plan (“CPP”), which was designed to reduce greenhouse gas emissions 
through regulation of electricity generation.22 These are areas in which 
the Trump administration made the most progress in reversing Obama-
era policy.23 In addition, unlike some of Trump’s other deregulatory 
 
 20. See Juliet Eilperin & Darla Cameron, How Trump Is Rolling Back Obama’s Legacy, 
WASH. POST (Jan. 20, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/politics/trump-rolling-
back-obama-rules [https://perma.cc/563W-D7F2] (showing that 96 out of 130 deregulatory actions 
seeking to reverse Obama-era regulations were Cabinet-level agency decisions); Tracking 
Deregulation in the Trump Era, BROOKINGS INST. (last updated Dec. 21, 2020) [hereinafter 
Tracking Deregulation], https://www.brookings.edu/interactives/tracking-deregulation-in-the-
trump-era [https://perma.cc/U5MK-UV4T] (compiling Trump-era deregulatory actions, a 
majority of which involved rules). 
 21. Tracking Deregulation, supra note 20.  
 22. For an overview of the CPP, see Fact Sheet: Overview of the Clean Power Plan, EPA 
WEB ARCHIVE, https://archive.epa.gov/epa/cleanpowerplan/fact-sheet-overview-clean-power-
plan.html [https://perma.cc/MTT4-9QPW]. 
 23. A 2020 database compiled by the Brookings Institute used filters to categorize the Trump 
administration’s deregulatory actions by sector, like “Education” and “Telecom.” Tracking 
Deregulation, supra note 20. The “Environmental” filter produced the most results by a large 
margin. Id; see also Nadja Popvich, Livia Albeck-Ripka & Kendra Pierre-Louis, The Trump 
Administration Is Reversing Nearly 100 Environmental Rules. Here’s the Full List., N.Y. TIMES 
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efforts, they involved Obama-era regulations that were justified from 
a cost-benefit perspective.24 In this Part, we examine the four most 
significant of these deregulations. Our goal is to expose the legal 
mechanisms that the Trump administration deployed to eliminate or 
weaken these cost-benefit-justified regulations. 
A. Mercury Regulation 
The Trump administration’s effort to deregulate mercury 
emissions from power plants was the latest step on a long and twisting 
path.25 In 1990, Congress passed an amendment to the Clean Air Act, 
which required the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) 
to regulate mercury emissions among other hazardous pollutants that 
it had neglected.26 By the end of the 1990s, the EPA had placed power 
plants on a list of significant sources of mercury emissions, triggering a 
provision of the law requiring these plants to be regulated under the 
demanding Maximum Achievable Control Technology (“MACT”) 
standard.27 Before the EPA had a chance to promulgate a rule based 
on MACT for those plants, the Clinton administration ended. The 
Bush EPA reversed course. Rather than issue MACT standards, the 
EPA delisted the power plants, which meant that MACT was not 
required.28 The EPA proposed a more relaxed regulatory regime 
known as the Clean Air Mercury Rule, which imposed a cap-and-trade 
system.29 However, the Bush rule was struck down in 2008 by the D.C. 
 
(last updated Nov. 10, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/climate/trump-
environment-rollbacks-list.html [https://perma.cc/GS55-D3BA] (summarizing environmental 
rules that have been “targeted for reversal”). 
 24. For example, the Trump administration reversed the Obama-era net neutrality rules. See 
Restoring Internet Freedom Act, 83 Fed. Reg. 7852 (Feb. 22, 2018) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. 
pts. 1, 8, 20) (“Finding that transparency is sufficient to protect the openness of the internet and 
that conduct rules have greater costs than benefits, the Order eliminates the conduct rules 
imposed by the Title II Order.”). The Obama Federal Communications Commission, however, 
never undertook a cost-benefit analysis of the net neutrality rules. L. Gordon Crovitz, Opinion, 
‘Economics-Free’ Obamanet, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 31, 2016, 6:20 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
economics-free-obamanet-1454282427 [https://perma.cc/4K9C-YA5X]. 
 25. For two useful overviews, see generally Keith Harley, Mercurial but not Swift—U.S. 
EPA’s Initiative To Regulate Coal Plant Mercury Emissions Changes Course Again as It Enters a 
Third Decade, 86 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 277 (2011); James L. Simpson, Why EPA’s Mercury and Air 
Toxics Standards Matter—History and Health, 49 AM. BAR ASS’N 5 (Nov.–Dec. 2017).  
 26. Harley, supra note 25, at 280–81. 
 27. Id. at 282–83.  
 28. Id. at 283–84. 
 29. Id. at 284. 
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Circuit because the EPA had not complied with the legally required 
procedure for delisting a source of hazardous emissions.30 
In 2012, the now-Obama EPA revived the Clinton approach and 
issued MACT-based mercury-emission rules for coal- and oil-fired 
power plants.31 These are known as the Mercury and Air Toxics 
Standards, but we will call them collectively “the mercury rule” to 
avoid acronym overload. The rule was based on studies indicating that 
mercury emitted by power plants found its way into water bodies, 
where it was consumed by fish that were eaten by consumers.32 The 
mercury levels in these fish posed a threat to the neurological 
development of fetuses carried by women who consumed the fish.33 
Thus, the EPA concluded that it was “appropriate and necessary” to 
issue regulations, a finding required by § 112(n)(1)(A) of the Clean Air 
Act.34 The mercury rule limited the amount of mercury emissions as 
well as emissions of other hazardous substances, and imposed 
restrictions on the operation of the power plants.35 In 2015, the 
Supreme Court struck down the mercury rule.36 The problem was that 
the EPA had failed to consider cost when it determined that it was 
“appropriate and necessary” to regulate the power plants back in 2000 
and again in 2012 when it affirmed the earlier determination.37 After 
conducting additional review to satisfy the Supreme Court’s 
requirement, the EPA still concluded that the rule was lawful because, 
 
 30. See New Jersey v. EPA, 517 F.3d 574, 577–78 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (“Because coal-fired 
EGUs are listed sources under section 112, regulation of existing coal-fired EGUs’ mercury 
emissions under section 111 is prohibited, effectively invalidating CAMR’s regulatory 
approach.”). 
 31. EPA, National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants From Coal- and Oil-
Fired Electric Utility Steam Generating Units and Standards of Performance for Fossil-Fuel-
Fired Electric Utility, Industrial-Commercial-Institutional, and Small Industrial-Commercial-
Institutional Steam Generating Units, 77 Fed. Reg. 9304 (2012); see also Fact Sheet: Mercury and 
Air Toxic Standards for Power Plants, Summary, EPA (Dec. 2011) [hereinafter Fact Sheet], 
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-11/documents/20111221matssummaryfs.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/69NA-BWUC]. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Michigan v. EPA, 576 U.S. 743, 749 (2015).  
 35. Fact Sheet, supra note 31.  
 36. Michigan, 576 U.S. at 758–60. 
 37. Id. at 759 (“The Agency must consider cost—including, most importantly, cost of 
compliance—before deciding whether regulation is appropriate and necessary.”). 
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even taking costs into account, the benefits were large enough to justify 
the regulation.38 
This set the stage for the Trump administration. The Trump EPA 
might have again delisted power plants from the list of hazardous 
sources, but, perhaps fearing a repetition of the Bush EPA’s debacle, 
it chose a different deregulatory approach. Instead of delisting power 
plants, the Trump EPA chose to rescind the Obama EPA’s earlier 
finding that the mercury rule was “appropriate and necessary.”39 Back 
in 2011, the Obama administration had issued a cost-benefit analysis 
that showed that the rule generated benefits of $37 to $90 billion per 
year at a 3 percent discount rate and costs of $9.6 billion.40 In 2016, it 
cited that cost-benefit analysis to satisfy the Supreme Court’s 
requirement that the EPA consider cost when it made its “appropriate 
and necessary” determination.41 By contrast, the Trump EPA 
concluded that the cost-benefit analysis, in fact, showed that the 
regulation would not be “appropriate and necessary.”42 The reason was 
that the benefit from the reduction of mercury emissions alone was 
only $4 to $6 million per year;43 the vast bulk of the total benefit was 
 
 38. EPA Supplemental Finding that It Is Appropriate and Necessary To Regulate 
Hazardous Air Pollutants from Coal- and Oil-Fired Electric Utility Steam Generating Units; 
Final Rule, 81 Fed. Reg. 24,420, 24,420–21 (Apr. 25, 2016) [hereinafter Supplemental Finding] 
(justifying the costs of 40 C.F.R. pts. 63.9980–63.10042). 
 39. EPA National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants: Coal- and Oil-Fired 
Electric Utility Steam Generating Units–Reconsideration of Supplemental Finding and Residual 
Risk and Technology Review, 84 Fed. Reg. 2670, 2670 (proposed Feb. 7, 2019) (to be codified at 
40 C.F.R. pt. 63) [hereinafter Mercury Reconsideration] (rejecting the EPA’s Supplemental 
Finding justifying the costs of 40 C.F.R. pts. 63.9980–63.10042); EPA National Emission 
Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants: Coal- and Oil-Fired Electric Utility Steam Generating 
Units–Reconsideration of Supplemental Finding and Residual Risk and Technology Review, 85 
Fed. Reg. 31,286 (Final Rule, May 22, 2020) (adopting in full the agency’s proposed course of 
action).  
 40. EPA, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS FOR THE FINAL MERCURY AND AIR TOXICS 
STANDARDS, at ES-1 (2011), https://www3.epa.gov/ttn/ecas/docs/ria/utilities_ria_final-mats_2011-
12.pdf [https://perma.cc/D94C-K8XQ].  
 41. See Supplemental Finding, supra note 38, at 24,425 (“Specifically, the EPA estimated 
that the final MATS would yield total annual monetized benefits (in 2007 dollars) of between $37 
billion to $90 billion using a 3-percent discount rate.”). 
 42. See Mercury Reconsideration, supra note 39, at 2670 (considering the cost of compliance 
relative to the Hazardous Air Pollutant (“HAP”) benefits of regulation and proposing to find that 
“it is not ‘appropriate and necessary’ to regulate HAP emissions from coal- and oil-fired electric 
generating units, thereby reversing the agency’s prior conclusion under the Clean Air Act 
§ 112(n)(1)(A) and correcting flaws in the agency’s prior response to Michigan v. EPA”). 
 43. See id. at 2677 (“The total cost of compliance with MATS . . . vastly outweighs the 
monetized HAP benefits of the rule ($4 to $6 million annually).”). 
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due to the reduction in particulate matter emissions44 that would be 
generated by the same regulation.45 Health benefits caused by 
reductions in particulate matter are called “co-benefits,”46 because they 
result from the regulation, but not from reductions in the pollutant that 
is specifically being regulated.47 For decades, agencies have treated co-
benefits as on equal footing with other types of benefits when analyzing 
regulations.48  However, the Trump EPA argued to the contrary, 
claiming that the co-benefits of regulating mercury could not be taken 
into account.49 Without including the co-benefits, the cost of the 
regulation vastly exceeded the relevant benefit—the reduction in 
 
 44. “Particulate matter” is the catch-all term for solid and liquid particles found in the air. 
When inhaled, particulate matter can be extremely hazardous to human health. See Particulate 
Matter (PM) Basics, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/pm-pollution/particulate-matter-pm-basics 
[https://perma.cc/AN3B-MGPY] (defining particulate matter and noting its health risks). 
Reductions in particulate matter emissions thus lead to high levels of regulatory benefits, as in 
this regulation. 
 45. See Mercury Reconsideration, supra note 39, at 2677 (“[T]he vast majority of estimated 
monetized benefits resulting from MATS are associated with reductions . . . criteria pollutants 
and precursors to criteria pollutants that are already addressed by the cavalcade of statutory 
provisions governing levels of these pollutants.”).  
 46. See Supplemental Finding, supra note 38, at 24,440–41 (disagreeing with commentators 
who argued it was inappropriate to consider co-benefits, which include health benefits).  




 48. See, e.g., NAT’L CTR. FOR ENV’T ECON., OFF. OF POL’Y, EPA, GUIDELINES FOR 
PREPARING ECONOMIC ANALYSES 11-2 (2010), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2017-
08/documents/ee-0568-50.pdf [https://perma.cc/H484-UEEZ] (stating that a consideration of 
costs and benefits “should include directly intended effects and associated costs, as well as 
ancillary (or co-) benefits and costs”); see also, e.g., EPA, COSTS AND BENEFITS OF REDUCING 
LEAD IN GASOLINE VI-1–4 (1985), https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPURL.cgi?Dockey=
9100YK16.txt [https://perma.cc/T4CY-WL86] (analyzing the co-benefits of reductions in 
pollutants other than lead from reducing lead in gasoline). 
 49. See Mercury Reconsideration, supra note 39, at 2675–76; EPA National Emission 
Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants: Coal- and Oil-Fired Electric Utility Steam Generating 
Units—Reconsideration of Supplemental Finding and Residual Risk and Technology Review, 85 
Fed. Reg. 31,286, 31,298–99 (May 22, 2020) (to be codified at 40 CFR pts. 63.9980–63.10042); 
Connor Raso, Examining the EPA’s Proposal To Exclude Co-Benefits of Mercury Regulation, 
BROOKINGS INST. (Apr. 1, 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/research/examining-the-epas-
proposal-to-exclude-co-benefits-of-mercury-regulation [https://perma.cc/48SA-3YFW] (“The 
EPA (and its allies) argues that co-benefits should not be included to support this required 
showing because they do not relate to the primary purpose of the Clean Air Act provision under 
which the mercury rule was issued.”).  
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mercury emissions.50 Although the Trump EPA did not move to 
rescind the regulation, it laid the basis for a challenge by regulated 
parties. 
The Trump EPA’s conclusion was based on a legal interpretation 
of the Clean Air Act amendments rather than on a new cost-benefit 
analysis. Section 112(n)(1)(A) states: 
The Administrator shall perform a study of the hazards to public 
health reasonably anticipated to occur as a result of emissions by 
electric utility steam generating units [that is, power plants] of 
pollutants listed under subsection (b) [mercury emissions] after 
imposition of the requirements of this chapter . . . . The Administrator 
shall regulate electric utility steam generating units under this section, 
if the Administrator finds such regulation is appropriate and 
necessary after considering the results of the study required by this 
subparagraph.51 
The Obama EPA argued—citing the deference to which it is entitled 
under Chevron—that it was free to take into account co-benefits when 
determining whether a regulation was “appropriate and necessary.”52 
This was consistent with long-standing executive branch policy that 
favored taking co-benefits into account.53 By contrast, the Trump EPA 
took the position that the purpose of § 112(n)(1)(A) is to authorize 
regulation of mercury emissions that are needed to address the health 
hazards caused by those emissions.54 If the main effect of the rule was 
to reduce particulate matter pollution, then it should have been issued 
under the section of the Clean Air Act that authorizes the EPA to 
 
 50. See Mercury Reconsideration, supra note 39, at 2675–78 (calculating the costs of 
regulation without co-benefits and concluding that HAP should not be regulated by controlling 
electric generating units, as the cost of the regulation exceeded its benefits).  
 51. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7412(n)(1)(A) (2018). 
 52. See Supplemental Finding, supra note 38, at 24,439 (“[N]othing in the CAA, or the 
supporting legislative history, suggests that benefits associated with pollutants other than the 
targeted pollutants are irrelevant to a benefit-cost analysis or must be ignored by the EPA in this 
context.”).  
 53. The OMB circular instructs:  
Your analysis should look beyond the direct benefits and direct costs of your 
rulemaking and consider any important ancillary benefits and countervailing risks. An 
ancillary benefit is a favorable impact of the rule that is typically unrelated or secondary 
to the statutory purpose of the rulemaking (e.g., reduced refinery emissions due to 
more stringent fuel economy standards for light trucks). 
OFF. OF MGMT. & BUDGET, CIRCULAR A-4 (2003), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/omb/
circulars_a004_a-4 [https://perma.cc/WP3P-PVVB]. 
 54. Mercury Reconsideration, supra note 39, at 2676. 
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regulate particulate matter.55 The agency presumably believed that a 
court, under Chevron, would ultimately give deference to this 
interpretation. 
B. The Clean Power Plan 
The Trump administration’s most controversial regulatory 
achievement was the EPA’s repeal of the Obama EPA’s CCP56 and its 
replacement with the Affordable Clean Energy initiative. The CPP was 
the Obama administration’s most significant regulatory attempt to 
reduce the emission of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases, 
with the goal of slowing, or eventually stopping, climate change. The 
CPP required states to drastically reduce the quantity of greenhouse 
gases emitted within their borders.57 Other air pollutants such as sulfur 
dioxide or particulate matter are typically “captured” or eliminated at 
the mouth of a smokestack or the tailpipe of a car.58 By contrast, the 
technology to capture carbon dioxide after a fossil fuel has been burnt 
is still in its infancy,59 and it is unclear whether it can be produced cost-
effectively at scale.60 Accordingly, the CPP would have required states 
to switch the mixture of fuels used to produce electricity within their 
 
 55. See id. (“[T]hese statements acknowledging that reductions in HAP can have the 
collateral benefit of reducing non-HAP emissions and vice versa, provides no support for the 
proposition that any such co-benefits should be the Agency’s primary consideration when making 
a finding under CAA section 112(n)(1)(A).” (emphasis added)). 
 56. Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility 
Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,662 (Oct. 23, 2015) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60) 
[hereinafter Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources]. 
 57. Id. at 64,673, 64,826–27. 
 58. See China Zmuida, How To Remove Pollutants from Smokestacks, SCIENCING (Nov. 22, 
2019), https://sciencing.com/how-6340282-remove-pollutants-smokestacks.html [https://
perma.cc/YNJ7-TX46] (“To control air pollution, methods for keeping smokestacks clean are 
needed to minimize the output of particulates and gas emissions.”); Capturing CO2 Directly from 
Truck Exhaust and Reducing Emissions 90%, SCITECHDAILY (Dec. 31, 2019), https://
scitechdaily.com/capturing-co2-directly-from-truck-exhaust-and-reducing-emissions-90 [https://
perma.cc/WPY7-XMZ6] (describing the process of capturing carbon dioxide directly in the 
trucks’ exhaust system).  
 59. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Energy, U.S. Department of Energy Announces $110M 
for Carbon Capture, Utilization, and Storage (Sept. 13, 2019), https://www.energy.gov/articles/us-
department-energy-announces-110m-carbon-capture-utilization-and-storage [https://perma.cc/
TZU6-STCJ] (announcing up to $110 million in federal investment in carbon capture, utilization, 
and storage research and development, and noting the technology’s “transformative potential”). 
 60. See Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources, supra note 
56, at 64,689, 64,727, 64,756 (noting that carbon capture technology is “energy resource intensive,” 
expensive because of its integrated electricity systems, and more expensive than other systems of 
emissions reductions).  
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borders, decreasing the use of coal and increasing the use of (cleaner) 
natural gas and renewables.61 
The benefits that would have been generated by the CPP fall into 
two categories. First, the CPP would have reduced total nationwide 
emissions of greenhouse gases, particularly carbon dioxide, thus 
decreasing the effects of climate change.62 The Obama EPA estimated 
the carbon dioxide reductions would produce approximately $20 
billion in annual benefits by 2030.63 In addition, the overall reduction 
in coal-fired power plants would have reduced emissions of particulate 
matter and a number of other air pollutants that can be highly 
dangerous to health.64 Like the mercury regulation described above, 
these were considered co-benefits.65 These additional emissions 
reductions were expected to yield approximately $24 billion in annual 
health benefits by the year 2030, for a total of $44 billion in benefits.66 
The Obama EPA further predicted that the CPP would generate 
roughly $8.4 billion in costs.67 It thus appeared that the CPP would 
generate benefits that substantially exceeded its costs. 
Trump’s Affordable Clean Energy (“ACE”) plan, promulgated in 
July 2019, reversed Obama’s CPP.68 Thus, in performing a cost-benefit 
analysis of the ACE plan, the Trump EPA effectively recalculated all 
of the costs and benefits of the CPP to determine the economic effects 
 
 61. See Daniel A. Farber, Regulatory Review in Anti-Regulatory Times, 94 CHI.-KENT L. 
REV. 383, 419–21 (2019) (“[I]n order to reduce carbon dioxide emissions, the Plan would require 
utilities to scale back electricity generation at coal-fired plants in favor of generators using natural 
gas or renewable sources.”). 
 62. See EPA, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS FOR THE CLEAN POWER PLAN FINAL 
RULE, at ES-10 (2015) [hereinafter RIA CLEAN POWER PLAN], https://www3.epa.gov/ttnecas1/
docs/ria/utilities_ria_final-clean-power-plan-existing-units_2015-08.pdf [https://perma.cc/9Z8N-
KGBE] (noting that the CPP’s emission guidelines would lower the ozone concentration level). 
 63. Id. at ES-20 tbl.ES-7. This is based on a 3 percent discount rate. The Obama Regulatory 
Impact Analysis did not report cumulative benefits over a multiyear period. Instead, it reported 
only expected benefits for particular years in the future, which is why we refer to the benefits in 
2030 in the text above. 
 64. Id. at ES-10.  
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at ES-20 tbl.ES-7. The EPA reported the expected total benefits as a range of $34 to 
$54 billion (using a 3 percent discount rate). We report the midpoint of that range here. Again, 
the Obama EPA did not calculate total estimated benefits, only annual benefits for certain years.  
 67. Id. at ES-22 tbl.ES-9. 
 68. Repeal of the Clean Power Plan; Emission Guidelines for Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
From Existing Electric Utility Generating Units; Revisions to Emission Guidelines Implementing 
Regulations, 84 Fed. Reg. 32,520, 32,521 (July 8, 2019) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60) 
[hereinafter Repeal of Clean Power Plan]. 
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of repealing that rule. Trump’s economic analysis differed substantially 
from Obama’s. First, the Trump EPA announced that it would include 
only domestic climate benefits in its analysis, not worldwide climate 
benefits.69 That is, it counted only the benefits that would be felt by 
people living within the United States.70 The domestic costs of climate 
change are expected to be only a small fraction of the worldwide costs, 
in part because the United States has only 5 percent of the world’s 
population and only 20 percent of its economic activity.71 Accordingly, 
the Trump EPA predicted that the CPP would have generated only 
$500 million in annual benefits from lower emissions of greenhouse 
gases,72 a 97.5 percent reduction from the Obama EPA’s $20 billion 
calculation. 
In addition, the Trump EPA took a different approach from the 
Obama EPA in deciding how to count the benefits from reductions in 
particulate matter and other non-greenhouse gas pollutants. The 
Trump EPA did not treat these co-benefits as zero, as the 
administration did in the mercury regulation.73 However, it counted an 
emissions reduction as a benefit only if that reduction would not have 
been required under existing law.74 The Obama EPA, by contrast, had 
counted emissions reductions as benefits if the CPP had required 
 
 69. EPA, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS FOR THE PROPOSED EMISSION GUIDELINES FOR 
GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS FROM EXISTING ELECTRIC UTILITY GENERATING UNITS; REVISIONS 
TO EMISSION GUIDELINE IMPLEMENTING REGULATIONS; REVISIONS TO NEW SOURCE REVIEW 
PROGRAM 4-3 (2018) [hereinafter RIA FOR PROPOSED EMISSION GUIDELINES], https://www.epa.gov/
sites/production/files/2018-08/documents/utilities_ria_proposed_ace_2018-08.pdf [https://perma.cc/
W2RE-T7Z3] (following the guidance of Executive Order 13,783 and adopting a domestic perspective 
in the central analysis).  
 70. Id. at ES-10; see also Farber, supra note 61, at 415–17 (analyzing Executive Order 
13,783’s requirement that agencies consider only domestic costs and benefits). See generally 
Arden Rowell, Foreign Impacts and Climate Change, 39 HARV. ENV’T L. REV. 371 (2015) 
(exploring U.S. agencies’ increasing analysis of global impact of emissions, despite the traditional 
practice of only looking at domestic impact without considering their statutory authority to 
analyze global impact). 
 71. Approximately 95 percent of the costs of climate change will likely be borne by people 
living outside of the United States. Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Climate Regulation and 
the Limits of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1557, 1591–92 (2011); Economy & Trade, 
OFF. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, https://ustr.gov/issue-areas/economy-trade [https://
perma.cc/4ZGZ-2D5H] (“Americans generate and earn more than 20 percent of the world’s total 
income.”).  
 72. RIA FOR PROPOSED EMISSION GUIDELINES, supra note 69, at ES-13 tbl.ES-9. 
 73. Id. at ES-10 (“We refer to air pollution health benefits as ancillary ‘co-benefits’ because 
they result from policies affecting CO2, but are not the goal of this policy.”).  
 74. Id. at ES-10–11 (noting that its “modeling accounted for the current suite of local, state 
and federal policies expected to reduce PM2.5 and PM2.5 precursor emissions in future years”).  
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reductions below current pollution levels.75 In other words, imagine 
that the CPP would have effectively capped emissions of particular 
matter in some area of the country at 50 units per year. If current law 
limited emissions to 100 units per year, but polluters were currently 
producing 150 units per year, the Obama EPA would have estimated 
the benefits of the CPP based on a reduction of 100 units per year (150 
minus 50), while the Trump EPA would have estimated those same 
benefits based on a reduction of 50 units per year (100 minus 50).76 
After making this change, the Trump EPA estimated the annual co-
benefits from these reductions at approximately $8.1 billion, down 
from the $24 billion estimated by the Obama EPA.77 
Despite these changes, the Trump EPA reported that its repeal of 
the Obama CPP would produce costs well in excess of benefits. 
Repealing the CPP was expected to produce net annual costs of 
approximately $4.5 billion,78 or $54 billion in total costs through the 
year 2037.79 The Trump EPA also offered a variety of different options 
involving partial repeals of the CPP—all of those options failed a cost-
benefit test as well. Even despite the differences in CBA methodology, 
the Trump EPA could not escape the conclusion that the Obama CPP 
would produce benefits that exceeded its costs.80 
 
 75. See RIA CLEAN POWER PLAN, supra note 62, at ES-17 (“[W]e multiplied the benefit-
per-ton estimates by the corresponding emission reductions that were generated from air quality 
modeling of the proposed Clean Power Plan.”). 
 76. To be clear, it is entirely possible that the Trump EPA’s approach—both with respect to 
greenhouse gases and non-greenhouse gases—was superior and better-justified. Our goal here is 
not to criticize the choices made by the Trump EPA in the course of its cost-benefit analysis. 
Rather, our objective is to examine the effects of the Trump EPA’s decision on its overall cost-
benefit analysis, as well as the EPA’s legal approach in light of that cost-benefit analysis.  
 77. RIA FOR PROPOSED EMISSION GUIDELINES, supra note 69, at ES-13 tbl.ES-9. Here, too, 
the EPA reported estimated annual benefits as a range from $4.9 to $11.4 billion, again using a 3 
percent discount rate. We report the midpoint of that range. 
 78. Id. at ES-16 tbl.ES-12. This is the midpoint of a range of $3.1 to $6.8 billion, using a 
discount rate of 3 percent. In between the promulgation of the CPP and Trump’s re-estimation of 
its costs and benefits, the estimated compliance costs also fell. Compare id. (estimating annual 
compliance costs of $400 million), with EPA, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS FOR THE CLEAN 
POWER PLAN FINAL RULE, at ES-22 tbl.ES-9 (2015), https://www3.epa.gov/ttnecas1/docs/ria/
utilities_ria_final-clean-power-plan-existing-units_2015-08.pdf [https://perma.cc/CK87-DKFC] 
(estimating annual compliance costs of $1 billion or more).  
 79. RIA FOR PROPOSED EMISSION GUIDELINES, supra note 69, at ES-16 tbl.ES-12. This is 
the midpoint of a range of $37.2 to $81.5 billion, using a discount rate of 3 percent.  
 80. In an updated CBA issued a year after its first assessment, the Trump EPA took an 
entirely different (and even less plausible) tack. There, it argued that secular trends in the energy 
industry put the country on track to meet the CPP’s emissions targets even without legal 
intervention. EPA, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS FOR THE REPEAL OF THE CLEAN POWER 
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To justify its deregulation, the Trump administration adopted a 
legal tactic reminiscent of its Chevronizing approach to the mercury 
regulation. The Clean Air Act directs the EPA to establish “standards 
of performance for any existing source”81 and then defines “standard 
of performance” to mean: 
a standard for emissions of air pollutants which reflects the degree of 
emission limitation achievable through the application of the best 
system of emission reduction which (taking into account the cost of 
achieving such reduction and any nonair quality health and 
environmental impact and energy requirements) the Administrator 
determines has been adequately demonstrated.82 
The Obama EPA argued that a “system of emission reduction” was 
capacious enough to encompass plans requiring electricity producers 
to switch some production from coal-fired power plants to natural gas-
fired plants or renewable sources.83 That is, the Obama EPA believed 
that it could set emissions guidelines “that would generally require 
power generators to change their energy portfolios,” rather than 
requiring “technological or operational measures that can be applied 
to or at a single source.”84 
 
PLAN, AND THE EMISSION GUIDELINES FOR GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS FROM EXISTING 
ELECTRIC UTILITY GENERATING UNITS 2-1 (2019), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/
files/2019-06/documents/utilities_ria_final_cpp_repeal_and_ace_2019-06.pdf [https://perma.cc/
R8XW-E83L]. According to the EPA, power generators were phasing out coal-fired power plants 
on their own and would continue doing so. Id. at 2-4. It is difficult to believe that this trend would 
have begun without the CPP or that it would continue if the CPP were definitively repealed. This 
is akin to installing a stop sign at a busy intersection, observing that traffic accidents have 
decreased substantially, and concluding that the stop sign was never needed. The analogy is not 
perfect because implementation of the CPP was stayed by a court pending the Trump EPA’s 
repeal. Nonetheless, it strains credulity to imagine that power generators would have taken these 
actions without the threat of EPA regulation (and the possibility that regulation might be 
reinvigorated under a subsequent administration). What is more, if the CPP would produce no 
costs and benefits, as the EPA now claims, there is no meaningful reason to repeal it, and the 
EPA has not supplied one. Id. at 2-1. 
 81. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d)(1) (2018). 
 82. Id. § 7411(a)(1). 
 83. See Repeal of Clean Power Plan, supra note 68, at 32,523; Farber, supra note 61, at 421.  
 84. Repeal of Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: 
Electric Utility Generating Units, 82 Fed. Reg. 48,035, 48,037 (proposed Oct. 16, 2017) (to be 
codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60) [hereinafter Repeal of Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines]; see 
also Emission Guidelines for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Existing Electric Utility 
Generating Units; Revisions to Emission Guideline Implementing Regulations; Revisions to New 
Source Review Program, 83 Fed. Reg. 44,746, 44,748 (proposed Aug. 31, 2018) (to be codified at 
40 C.F.R. pts. 51–52, 60). This is sometimes referred to as regulation “outside of the fence-line.” 
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The Trump EPA disagreed with this position. It argued instead 
that the text of the statute required that a “standard of performance” 
be applied only to each “existing source” individually, rather than 
involving the simultaneous shifting of capacity from “sources,” such as 
coal-fired plants, to “non-sources,” such as nuclear plants or 
renewables.85 The EPA argued that this reading was compelled by both 
the reference to “any existing source” and by the use of the word 
“application,” claiming that “application” requires a particular 
object—an individual power plant—to which the system of emission 
reduction would be applied.86 Accordingly, the EPA concluded that the 
agency “is precluded from basing [its regulatory approach] on 
strategies like generation shifting and corresponding emissions offsets 
because these types of systems cannot be put into use at the regulated 
building, structure, facility, or installation.”87 
It is notable that, after initially invoking its authority under 
Chevron to justify its changing interpretation,88 the Trump EPA 
disclaimed any reliance on Chevron in announcing the final rule. 
Instead, the agency argued that the language of the Clean Air Act was 
unambiguous, and thus, there was “no interpretive room on which the 
EPA could seek deference for the CPP’s grid-wide management 
approach.”89 That is, the agency argued that its hands were tied at 
Chevron Step One: the statute did not permit the type of regulation the 
Obama EPA had promulgated. 
C. Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards 
1. Federal Fuel Economy Rules.  In 2012, the National Highway 
Traffic Safety Administration (“NHTSA”) and the EPA together 
promulgated new corporate average fuel economy (“CAFE”) 
standards that applied to cars and light trucks beginning in Model Year 
 
Rachel Jacobson, Trump Administration Issues Affordable Clean Energy Rule, WILMERHALE 
(June 25, 2019), https://www.wilmerhale.com/en/insights/client-alerts/20190625-trump-
administration-issues-affordable-clean-energy-rule [https://perma.cc/NVE5-XJCY]. 
 85. Repeal of Clean Power Plan, supra note 68, at 32,523–24. 
 86. Id. at 32,524.  
 87. Id. 
 88. Repeal of Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines, supra note 84, at 48,039. 
 89. Repeal of Clean Power Plan, supra note 68, at 32,532. In legal terms, this means the 
agency argued that the case should be decided at Chevron Step One, whereby Chevron deference 
does not apply to unambiguous legislative commands. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. 
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,  842–43 (1984). 
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2017.90 CAFE standards are imposed on a manufacturer-by-
manufacturer basis91: each automobile manufacturer is required to 
meet a specified average fuel economy standard across all of the 
automobiles sold by that manufacturer in a given year.92 Manufacturers 
can improve their average fuel economy by improving the fuel 
economy of individual cars or simply by selling more small cars, which 
have higher fuel economy, and fewer large cars, which have lower fuel 
economy. Under the Department of Transportation (“DOT”) and 
EPA regulations, the formula for calculating the precise fuel economy 
standard was complex and dependent upon the price of oil in a given 
year,93 but the effects were likely to be dramatic. The agencies 
anticipated that the average fuel economy across a manufacturer’s 
entire fleet of passenger cars would rise from roughly 39 miles per 
gallon (“mpg”) in 2017 to roughly 55 mpg in 2025, and from roughly 29 
mpg in 2017 for light trucks to roughly 40 mpg in 2025.94 
The heightened fuel economy standards were expected to produce 
significant net benefits. NHTSA estimated that the regulations would 
impose costs of roughly $155 billion but create benefits of $630 billion, 
thus producing net benefits of $475 billion.95 The majority of the costs 
were so-called “technology” costs—the costs of developing and 
installing more fuel-efficient engines.96 But one of the consequences of 
improved fuel economy is that individuals who own cars are likely to 
drive them more because they are cheaper to operate.97 NHTSA thus 
estimated that the regulation would create an additional $19 billion in 
costs from additional roadway congestion—due to cars being driven 
 
 90. 2017 and Later Model Year Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions and 
Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards, 77 Fed. Reg. 62,624 (Oct. 15, 2012) (codified at 40 
C.F.R pts. 85–86, 600; 49 C.F.R. pts. 523, 531, 533, 536–37). 
 91. Hence, the “corporate” in “corporate average fuel economy.”  
 92. See Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) Standards, U.S. DEP’T TRANSP. (Aug. 11, 
2014), https://www.transportation.gov/mission/sustainability/corporate-average-fuel-economy-cafe-
standards [https://perma.cc/8DJ6-SRW7].  
 93. See NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., FINAL REGULATORY IMPACT 
ANALYSIS, CORPORATE AVERAGE FUEL ECONOMY FOR MY 2017-MY 2025 PASSENGER CARS 
AND LIGHT TRUCKS 207 (2012) [hereinafter OBAMA RIA], https://www.nhtsa.gov/sites/
nhtsa.dot.gov/files/fria_2017-2025.pdf [https://perma.cc/LL3D-N2M3] (explaining that the CAFE 
model considered the extent to which manufacturers might apply fuel-saving technology “in 
consideration of future fuel prices”). 
 94. Id. at 14–15 tbls.3a–b. 
 95. This considers automobiles produced through Model Year 2025. Id. at 13 tbl.2. 
 96. These accounted for roughly $120 billion of the $155 billion in total costs. Id. at 49 tbl.13.  
 97. This is known as the “rebound effect.” See id. at 847.  
MASUR  POSNER IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 1/19/2021  5:10 PM 
2021] CHEVRONIZING AROUND CBA 1127 
more miles—and $9 billion in costs from additional automobile 
accidents.98 
On the benefits side, the primary expected benefit was a reduction 
in lifetime fuel expenditures by the owners of more fuel-efficient cars, 
approximately $485 billion.99 But NHTSA estimated that there would 
be significant additional benefits from the regulation as well, including 
benefits from reduced greenhouse gas emissions ($49 billion) and 
reduced particulate matter and sulfur emissions ($13 billion in total).100 
In 2020, Trump’s EPA and NHTSA announced a rule 
substantially amending the Obama-era CAFE standards with respect 
to Model Year 2021 and later automobiles.101 Trump’s rule increased 
fuel efficiency standards only very slightly from their 2020 levels, to 
47.1 mpg for cars and 34.1 mpg for light trucks in model year 2030, 
rather than the more substantial increases to 55 mpg for cars and 40 
mpg for light trucks required under the Obama administration rule.102 
Accordingly, whereas the Obama-era rule was expected to generate 
significant net benefits, one might have expected that the Trump-era 
rule—which largely reverses the Obama rule—would generate 
significant net costs. 
But this is not what the Trump EPA and NHTSA initially 
concluded. In their first attempt to calculate the costs and benefits of 
this new rule, those agencies estimated that fully repealing the Obama 
CAFE standards would avoid $502 billion in costs and reduce benefits 
by only $326 billion, for a net gain of $176 billion.103 This CBA 
 
 98. Id. at 49 tbl.13. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at 50 tbl.13. 
 101. The Safer Affordable Fuel-Efficient (SAFE) Vehicles Rule for Model Years 2021–2026 
Passenger Cars and Light Trucks, 85 Fed. Reg. 24,174 (Apr. 30, 2020) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. 
pts. 85–86). 
 102. NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN. & EPA, FINAL REGULATORY IMPACT 
ANALYSIS, THE SAFER AFFORDABLE FUEL-EFFICIENT (SAFE) VEHICLES RULE FOR MODEL 
YEAR 2021–2026 PASSENGER CARS AND LIGHT TRUCKS 11 tbl.I-3 (Mar. 2020) [hereinafter 
FINAL TRUMP RIA], https://www.nhtsa.gov/sites/nhtsa.dot.gov/files/documents/final_safe_fria_
web_version_200701.pdf [https://perma.cc/WE7L-DHRG]. 
 103. NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN. & EPA, PRELIMINARY REGULATORY 
IMPACT ANALYSIS, THE SAFER AFFORDABLE FUEL-EFFICIENT (SAFE) VEHICLES RULE FOR 
MODEL YEAR 2021–2026 PASSENGER CARS AND LIGHT TRUCKS 17 tbl.1-5 (July 2018) 
[hereinafter PRELIMINARY TRUMP RIA], https://www.nhtsa.gov/sites/nhtsa.dot.gov/files/
documents/ld_cafe_co2_nhtsa_2127-al76_epa_pria_181016.pdf [https://perma.cc/VLU2-MR6W]. 
Avoided costs are effectively benefits, and foregone benefits are effectively costs, hence the 
positive overall impact in this calculation. 
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conducted by Trump’s agencies considered a slightly different time 
period than the one conducted by Obama’s agencies, so the 
comparison is not quite one-to-one.104 These minor discrepancies aside, 
the end result was a substantial divergence between the Obama 
administration’s calculation that stricter fuel economy standards would 
produce significant net benefits and the Trump administration’s 
calculation that stricter standards would produce significant net costs. 
The vast divide between the Obama and Trump administrations’ 
calculations was driven by a number of factors. First, the Trump 
administration estimated significantly higher technology costs than 
Obama. For instance, the Obama NHTSA predicted roughly $90 
billion in technology costs for Model Year 2021–25 automobiles.105 By 
contrast, the Trump NHTSA estimated that technology costs would 
exceed $123 billion across those five years.106 Second, the Trump EPA 
calculated carbon emissions benefits and costs using the domestic cost 
of carbon,107 while the Obama EPA used the global cost of carbon.108 
Accordingly, where the Obama EPA estimated benefits from higher 
CAFE standards of roughly $36 billion across Model Years 2021–25,109 
the Trump EPA calculated the cost of foregone climate benefits from 
those years as only $2.6 billion.110 
Most importantly, the Trump administration estimated that 
Obama’s stricter fuel economy standards would lead to an enormous 
increase in the total number of miles that individuals drive their cars 
each year.111 Whereas the Obama EPA calculated the fuel cost savings 
from tighter fuel economy standards for Model Year 2021–25 
automobiles at more than $350 billion,112 Trump’s estimate came in 
 
 104. Compare OBAMA RIA, supra note 93, at 56 (considering model years 2017–25), with 
PRELIMINARY TRUMP RIA, supra note 103, at 129 (considering model years 2021–26). For 
instance, it is not necessarily significant that Trump estimated $502 billion in cost savings while 
Obama estimated total costs of only $155 billion. 
 105. OBAMA RIA, supra note 93, at 49 tbl.13. 
 106. PRELIMINARY TRUMP RIA, supra note 103, at 84 tbl.1-73. 
 107. See id. at 11.  
 108. See OBAMA RIA, supra note 93, at 904.  
 109. Id. at 50 tbl.13. This number was calculated by adding the values for carbon dioxide from 
the years 2021 to 2025. 
 110. PRELIMINARY TRUMP RIA, supra note 103, at 85 tbl.1-73. This number was calculated 
by combining the values for carbon dioxide damage reduction benefit from the years 2021 to 2025.  
 111. See id. at 993 (predicting a rebound effect of 20 percent, twice the Obama EPA’s 
number). 
 112. See OBAMA RIA, supra note 93, at 49 tbl.13.  
MASUR  POSNER IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 1/19/2021  5:10 PM 
2021] CHEVRONIZING AROUND CBA 1129 
under $82 billion.113 The reason, according to the Trump 
administration, was that the benefits to consumers of better fuel 
economy would be nearly outweighed by the fuel costs of the 
additional miles those consumers would drive.114 Relatedly, the Obama 
EPA estimated that tighter fuel economy standards would yield small 
reductions in fatalities from driving.115 Individuals would drive 
somewhat more, but the cars they drove would be newer and smaller, 
and thus safer. By contrast, the Trump administration estimated that 
loosening the fuel economy standards would save 6,340 lives,116 which 
it valued at an additional $35.4 billion, because people would be less 
likely to drive cars that were more expensive to operate.117 These 
estimates—particularly the claim that stricter fuel economy standards 
would lead to enormous increases in driving—were widely viewed as 
implausible,118 and the agencies received significant criticism for their 
 
 113. PRELIMINARY TRUMP RIA, supra note 103, at 84 tbl.1-73. 
 114. See id. 
 115. See OBAMA RIA, supra note 93, at 50 tbl.13 (finding the value of reduced fatalities over 
the fifteen-year total to be between $9 and $568 million). 
 116. PRELIMINARY TRUMP RIA, supra note 103, at 92 tbl.1-77. 
 117. Id. at 84 tbl.1-73. In addition, if consumers would drive much more with stricter fuel 
standards (the Obama regulation) than they would with weaker fuel standards (the Trump 
deregulation), this should also mean that they gain much greater consumer surplus from driving 
with stricter fuel standards. If a driver owns a car with better fuel economy and chooses to drive 
twenty miles instead of ten, the driver must be getting some welfare benefit from the additional 
miles driven, despite the fact that she is paying for more gas to drive the additional miles. 
Accordingly, if the Trump EPA estimated that total vehicle miles driven would drop substantially 
under its deregulation, it should have also estimated that total consumer surplus from driving 
would drop substantially. But in fact, the Trump EPA’s estimate of consumer surplus from driving 
was almost identical to the Obama EPA’s estimate. Compare OBAMA RIA, supra note 93, at 49 
tbl.13, with PRELIMINARY TRUMP RIA, supra note 103, at 84 tbl.1-73 (showing roughly identical 
numbers for consumer surplus in Model Years 2021–25). The Trump EPA does not attempt to 
explain or justify how it arrived at this calculation, so it is difficult to evaluate. But on its face, it 
appears implausible. 
 118. According to the Trump EPA’s analysis, weakening fuel economy standards would 
actually decrease the total number of cars on the road, even though new cars would be cheaper to 
purchase. See Alan Krupnick, Joshua Linn & Virginia McConnell, Critiquing the Trump 
Administration’s Analysis of Consumer Behavior in the Proposed CAFE Standards, RES. FOR 
FUTURE (Sept. 17, 2018), https://www.resourcesmag.org/common-resources/critiquing-the-
trump-administrations-analysis-of-consumer-behavior-in-the-proposed-cafe-standards [https://
perma.cc/BW8Y-SS3E] (noting “the agencies’ argument that weakening the standards reduces 
the total size of the on-road fleet”). The agency’s reason was that the higher price of new cars 
under the Obama rule would make used cars more valuable, and so more people would choose 
to hold onto their used cars. See id. (explaining that “tighter standards raise used vehicle prices 
and delay scrappage of old vehicles”). That is, the Trump EPA estimated that higher fuel 
economy standards would make new cars more expensive, leading to fewer new cars on the road. 
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calculations during the regulatory comment period.119 Cost-benefit 
analysis is subject to judicial review under the “arbitrary and 
capricious” standard of § 706 of the Administrative Procedure Act 
(“APA”).120 Regulations have been struck down as arbitrary and 
capricious when they rely on obviously unjustified or nonsensical cost-
benefit analyses,121 though review is often deferential.122 Nonetheless, 
the agencies’ dubious cost-benefit analysis at minimum created some 
risk that the regulation would not survive judicial scrutiny. 
 
This would in turn make used cars more valuable, leading to more used cars on the road and fewer 
used cars being scrapped. The net result, according to the Trump EPA, would be more total cars 
on the road in a world with stricter fuel economy standards. However, this conclusion contradicts 
basic principles of supply and demand, see Alan Krupnick, Joshua Linn & Virginia McConnell, 
Questions About the Trump Administration’s Cost-Benefit Analysis for Its Proposal To Freeze the 
CAFE Standards, RES. FOR FUTURE (Aug. 20, 2018), https://www.resourcesmag.org/common-
resources/questions-about-the-trump-administrations-cost-benefit-analysis-for-its-proposal-to-
freeze-the-cafe-standards [https://perma.cc/Y3BB-HX5U] (describing the Trump 
administration’s proposal as being “inconsistent with economics”), as well as with previous studies 
of CAFE standards, which found that lower standards are associated with more cars on the road, 
id. The Trump administration also assumed that increasing the number of cars on the road by 10 
percent would increase the number of miles driven by 10 percent, even if the number of drivers 
did not increase, which similarly seems to defy logic. See SYLWIA BIALEK, BETHANY DAVIS 
NOLL, PETER HOWARD, RICHARD REVESZ, JASON SCHWARTZ& AVI ZEVIN, INST. FOR POL’Y 
INTEGRITY, COMMENT REGARDING THE SAFER AFFORDABLE FUEL-EFFICIENT (SAFE) 
VEHICLES RULE FOR MODEL YEARS 2021–2026 PASSENGER CARS AND LIGHT TRUCKS 79 
(2018) [hereinafter INST. FOR POL’Y INTEGRITY, COMMENT], https://policyintegrity.org/
documents/Emissions_Standards_EPA_NHTSA_Comments_Oct2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/
Z8JC-BG75] (explaining that the Trump administration’s conclusion that the increase in total 
fleet size would automatically lead to an increase in the total vehicle miles traveled was illogical). 
 119. See generally INST. FOR POL’Y INTEGRITY, COMMENT, supra note 118 (offering 
quantitative critiques of many of the calculations in the Trump administration’s cost-benefit 
analysis); see also JOSHUA LINN, ALAN KRUPNICK, BENJAMIN LEARD & VIRGINIA 
MCCONNELL, COMMENTS TO NHTSA AND U.S. EPA ON THE SAFER AFFORDABLE FUEL-
EFFICIENT (SAFE) VEHICLES RULE FOR MODEL YEARS 2021–2026: PASSENGER CARS AND 
LIGHT TRUCKS 18 (2018), https://media.rff.org/documents/Comments_10-25-18_EPA-NHTSA_
final.pdf [https://perma.cc/M582-QL5E]. 
 120. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2018); see Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. 
Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 46 (1983) (subjecting a rescission order of NHTSA to the “arbitrary and 
capricious” standard). Other commentators agree with this stance. INST. FOR POL’Y INTEGRITY, 
COMMENT, supra note 118, at 10. 
 121. See generally Caroline Cecot & W. Kip Viscusi, Judicial Review of Agency Cost-Benefit 
Analysis, 22 GEO. MASON L. REV. 575 (2015) (surveying a large number of cases in which courts 
have evaluated agency cost-benefit analyses and finding that appellate courts have rejected many 
CBAs for being faulty). 
 122. See Jacob Gersen & Adrian Vermeule, Thin Rationality Review, 114 MICH. L. REV. 1355, 
1358 (2016) (finding that agencies have won 92 percent of arbitrariness challenges at the Supreme 
Court). 
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In response, the Trump administration issued a substantially 
revised cost-benefit analysis when it finalized the rule in April 2020. 
The agencies’ improbably high projections of cost savings from 
loosening fuel economy standards had been replaced by much smaller 
estimates. Rather than saving 6,340 lives, the Trump rule was now 
projected to save 3,344 lives.123 The Trump EPA’s estimate of the 
foregone climate benefits from loosening fuel economy standards 
doubled, from $2.6 billion to $5.2 billion.124 And the agencies’ estimate 
of the foregone fuel savings more than doubled, from $82 billion to 
$185.1 billion.125 All told, the Trump administration now calculated 
that loosening fuel economy standards would generate negative 
benefits of $13.1 billion.126 That is, this new regulation would do more 
harm than good.127 
This is a startling admission. As with the CPP, it is remarkable that 
an agency with every political incentive to doctor its cost-benefit 
analysis could not produce a plausible CBA that yielded its desired 
conclusion. Some scholars have suggested that CBA can be easily 
manipulated to yield whatever result a policymaker desires.128 The 
 
 123. FINAL TRUMP RIA,  supra note 102, at 11 tbl.I-3. 
 124. Id. at 48 tbl.I-74. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. at 49 tbl.I-74. Again, the comparison is not quite apples-to-apples with the prior 
Trump CBA. In its final rule, the Trump administration allowed fuel economy standards to rise 
very slightly (by about 3 mpg over the course of a decade) from the Model Year 2020 levels set 
by Obama, rather than holding them constant. See id. at 15–16, tbls.I-8 & I-10. This would tend to 
depress the Trump administration’s calculation of benefits. On the other hand, the final CBA 
calculated costs and benefits through 2029, rather than 2026 as in the earlier CBA. See id. at 14 
tbl.I-6. This would tend to inflate the administration’s calculation of benefits. These minor 
discrepancies are not enough to account for the full difference between the two cost-benefit 
analyses (which totaled nearly $190 billion), particularly given that they pull in opposite 
directions. 
 127. The EPA and NHTSA noted that using a discount rate of 7 percent for future costs and 
benefits, rather than 3 percent, the rule would create $16.1 billion in benefits (instead of $13.1 
billion in costs), and thus that the expected “net benefits straddle zero.” Id. at 9. Nonetheless, 
there are strong reasons to believe that 3 percent (or lower) is a more appropriate discount rate 
than 7 percent. See generally Daniel A. Farber & Paul A. Hemmersbaugh, The Shadow of the 
Future: Discount Rates, Later Generations, and the Environment, 46 VAND. L. REV. 267 (1993) 
(arguing for lower discount rates). But even if one places that point to the side, it is remarkable 
that the EPA and NHTSA admitted that this deregulation would yield negative benefits under a 
set of typical (if not preferred) assumptions. 
 128. See FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE PRICE 
OF EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING 61–90 (2004); Rebecca M. Bratspies, Regulatory 
Trust, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 575, 618 n.230 (2009) (“Recent attempts to reduce the assumed value of 
a human life in calculating costs and benefits, a change that would obviously reduce the benefits 
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Trump administration’s experiences with the CPP and the CAFE 
standards rollback stand as evidence to the contrary and demonstrate 
CBA’s robustness in the face of political machinations. 
Nonetheless, the fuel economy deregulation may face an 
uncertain future in the courts. Courts have struck down regulations as 
arbitrary and capricious when their CBAs appeared obviously faulty 
or revealed that the regulation’s costs would exceed its benefits, as is 
the case here.129 Cost-benefit analysis has already exerted a disciplining 
force on the Trump administration once, when it required the EPA and 
NHTSA to revise its initial implausible estimates. It may exert such a 
force again if a court rejects the fuel economy deregulation wholesale. 
2. California’s Clean Air Act Waiver.  As it turned out, eliminating 
the Obama-era CAFE standards and replacing them with much weaker 
fuel economy rules did not, by itself, succeed in lowering national fuel-
economy standards. The state of California has authority under the 
Clean Air Act to promulgate air quality standards that are more 
stringent than federal air quality standards.130 To do so, California must 
obtain a waiver from the EPA that exempts it from being preempted 
by federal rules.131 California has received dozens of such waivers in 
 
attributable to health and safety regulation, graphically reveal how malleable cost-
benefit analysis can be.”); Farber, supra note 61, at 432 (“[T]he experience of the Trump 
Administration may strengthen the argument that cost-benefit analysis is too malleable to be 
considered reliable.”); Sidney A. Shapiro & Christopher H. Schroeder, Beyond Cost-Benefit 
Analysis: A Pragmatic Reorientation, 32 HARV. ENV’T L. REV. 433, 446 (2008) (“[W]e know that 
CBA is easily biased by an analyst’s policy preferences because the methodology depends 
on malleable inferences and assumptions.”); Mark Eliot Shere, Building Trust: Conservatives and 
the Environment, 20 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 829, 855 (1997) (“Risk assessments typically follow 
an elaborate procedure that makes them malleable, expensive, and time consuming.”). But see 
Jonathan S. Masur, Cost-Benefit Analysis Under Trump: A Comment on Dan Farber’s Regulatory 
Review in Anti-Regulatory Times, 94 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 665, 670–71 (2019) (arguing that the 
experience with CBA under Trump demonstrates that CBA is not nearly as malleable as its critics 
maintained). 
 129. See, e.g., Owner-Operator Indep. Drivers Ass’n, Inc. v. Fed. Motor Carrier Safety 
Admin., 494 F.3d 188, 205 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (scrutinizing the agency’s modeling choices and 
rejecting the regulation on the basis that it did not articulate a reasonable explanation for dubious 
modeling decisions); Pub. Citizen v. Fed. Motor Carrier Safety Admin., 374 F.3d 1209, 1218 (D.C. 
Cir. 2004) (same); Corrosion-Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201, 1222–23 (5th Cir. 1991) 
(striking down the EPA’s proposed asbestos regulation because it would create costs in excess of 
benefits). See generally Cecot & Viscusi, supra note 121 (surveying a large number of cases in 
which courts have evaluated agency CBAs and finding many cases in which regulations have been 
rejected for faulty CBAs). 
 130. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b)(1) (2018). 
 131. Id. § 7543(b). 
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the past, including waivers from the Obama administration that 
remained in effect after the Trump EPA announced its intention to roll 
back Obama-era CAFE standards.132 Pursuant to that waiver, 
California announced an agreement with several major automakers 
that it would promulgate Obama’s CAFE standards as its own, and that 
these automakers would abide by them.133 Because of the size and 
importance of the California market, and the difficulty of 
manufacturing different automobiles with different levels of fuel 
economy for different states, the California rules would likely regulate 
fuel economy for all cars manufactured and sold throughout the 
country.134 
In September 2019, the Trump administration announced that it 
was withdrawing California’s preemption waiver.135 It made two 
arguments. First, it argued that California did not need stricter fuel 
economy standards to meet “compelling and extraordinary 
conditions,” as required by the Clean Air Act.136 According to the 
Trump administration, California’s standards were primarily intended 
to reduce emissions of carbon dioxide and help curb climate change.137 
But, the Trump agencies argued, because climate change is a global 
problem, and California’s carbon emissions do not remain in California 
or affect only Californians, California cannot claim to have an 
“extraordinary condition” that warrants particular standards.138 
 
 132. See Vehicle Emissions California Waivers and Authorizations, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/
state-and-local-transportation/vehicle-emissions-california-waivers-and-authorizations [https://
perma.cc/9GNY-2C5Y] (providing a list of federal register notices for Californian waivers); 
California Greenhouse Gas Waiver Request, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/regulations-emissions-
vehicles-and-engines/california-greenhouse-gas-waiver-request [https://perma.cc/J44K-R99D] 
(discussing Californian waivers and providing related documents associated with waiver requests). 
 133. California and Major Automakers Reach Groundbreaking Framework Agreement on 
Clean Emission Standards, OFF. GOV. GAVIN NEWSOM (July 25, 2019), https://www.gov.ca.gov/
2019/07/25/california-and-major-automakers-reach-groundbreaking-framework-agreement-on-
clean-emission-standards [https://perma.cc/DCX2-E65S]. 
 134. Id. (noting that the framework agreement maintains a national approach for 
participating automakers who will sell these cleaner cars nationwide).  
 135. The Safer Affordable Fuel-Efficient (SAFE) Vehicles Rule Part One: One National 
Program, 84 Fed. Reg. 51,310 (Sept. 27, 2019) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 85–86; 49 C.F.R. 
pts. 531, 533) [hereinafter SAFE One National Program Rule]. 
 136. Id. at 51,340; 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b)(1)(B). 
 137. See SAFE One National Program Rule, supra note 135, at 51,329.  
 138. Id. at 51,339 (“The GHG emissions from California cars are no more relevant to the 
pollution problem at issue (i.e., climate change) as it impacts California than are the GHG 
emissions from cars being driven in New York, London, Johannesburg, or Tokyo . . . .”). 
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Second, the Trump administration argued that state fuel economy 
standards were preempted by the Energy Policy and Conservation Act, 
which does not allow for state waivers.139 That law states: 
When an average fuel economy standard prescribed under this 
chapter is in effect, a State or a political subdivision of a State may 
not adopt or enforce a law or regulation related to fuel economy 
standards or average fuel economy standards for automobiles 
covered by an average fuel economy standard under this chapter.140 
This creates an obvious conflict with the Clean Air Act, which—in the 
context of fuel economy standards—would seem to explicitly permit 
precisely the sort of state action that the Energy Policy and 
Conservation Act prohibits. The only two courts to have confronted 
this issue both resolved it in favor of the Clean Air Act, and thus in 
favor of the state seeking a preemption waiver.141 Nonetheless, the 
Trump administration asserted that those courts were wrong and that 
states should be categorically preempted from issuing their own fuel 
economy standards under the Energy Policy and Conservation Act.142 
Notably, the Trump administration claimed that it should be 
entitled to Chevron deference with respect to both of these 
arguments.143 Like the federal CAFE standards themselves, the rule 
withdrawing California’s waiver was jointly promulgated by the EPA 
and NHTSA, the agencies charged with administering the relevant 
sections of the Clean Air Act144 and Energy Policy and Conservation 
Act,145 respectively. Relatedly, the EPA and NHTSA took the position 
that the withdrawal of California’s waiver was not a “rule” under 
 
 139. Id. at 51,311. 
 140. 49 U.S.C. § 32919(a) (2018). 
 141. See Green Mountain Chrysler Plymouth Dodge Jeep v. Crombie, 508 F. Supp. 2d 295, 
399 (D. Vt. 2007); Cent. Valley Chrysler-Jeep, Inc. v. Goldstene, 529 F. Supp. 2d 1151, 1190 (E.D. 
Cal. 2007). 
 142. SAFE One National Program Rule, supra note 135, at 51,314. 
 143. See id. at 51,333, 51,351.  
 144. Id. at 51,351 (“Where states are now adopting standards . . . far removed from NAAQS 
attainment planning or more specifically directed at global air pollution, EPA as the agency 
charged with implementing the Clean Air Act is acting well within that role in setting out an 
interpretation that aligns with Congressional intent.” (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. 
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984))). 
 145. Id. at 51,320 (“However, to the extent there is any ambiguity, NHTSA is the expert 
agency and its regulation adopted in this document is entitled to deference.”).  
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Executive Order 12,866.146 It thus declined to perform a cost-benefit 
analysis. 
The withdrawal of California’s Clean Air Act waiver is consistent 
with our theme of Chevronizing around CBA. Here, too, the Trump 
administration has deployed a series of legal arguments, coupled with 
a claim for Chevron deference, to evade consideration of the policy 
consequences of its actions. We evaluate the merits of these legal 
arguments in greater depth in the next Part. 
D. General Service Lamps 
In the waning days of the Obama administration, the Department 
of Energy (“DOE”) issued a regulation that would have banned the 
sale of traditional incandescent light bulbs in 2020.147 The regulation, 
along with the 2007 law that authorized it, led to the rapid growth of a 
market in energy-efficient light bulbs, including fluorescent, halogen, 
and LED.148 However, demand for the cheaper, less efficient 
incandescent light bulb remained strong, and the industry opposed the 
Obama regulation.149 In September 2019, the DOE issued a final rule 
withdrawing the Obama regulation.150 
The replacement 2019 regulation was accompanied by a quite 
mysterious cost-benefit analysis purporting to show that the regulation 
would reduce costs. Based on the industry’s “confidential estimates of 
total domestic shipments for the years 2015 to 2018,” and with its 
commitment to data transparency temporarily forgotten,151 the DOE 
argued that its regulation would reduce costs in the form of a 
“reduction in uncertainty” equal to roughly $50 million to $200 million 
per year.152 As far as we can understand, the “reduction in uncertainty” 
referred to uncertainty about whether the DOE itself would ultimately 
 
 146. Id. at 51,352 (“EPA’s action here, however, is not a rule as defined by Executive Order 
12866, consistent with its previous actions on waiver requests, and is therefore exempt from 
review by the Office of Management and Budget as required for rules and regulations by 
Executive Order 12,866.”). 
 147. Energy Conservation Program: Energy Conservation Standards for General Service 
Lamps, 82 Fed. Reg. 7276, 7322 (Jan. 19, 2017) [hereinafter Energy Conservation Standards]. 
 148. Nadja Popovich, America’s Light Bulb Revolution, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 8, 2019), https://
nyti.ms/37RyiMO [https://perma.cc/4E8Q-QRDQ]. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Energy Conservation Program: Definition for General Service Lamps, 84 Fed. Reg. 
46,661, 46,662 (Sept. 5, 2019) (to be codified at 10 C.F.R. pt. 430). 
 151. Id. at 46,674. 
 152. Id.  
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decide on a new efficiency rule allowing the sale of incandescent light 
bulbs or would instead trigger the statute’s backstop, which would have 
barred traditional incandescent bulbs. Because the industry cannot 
predict what the DOE will do, it must be prepared to deliver a large 
volume of light bulbs that will satisfy demand regardless of what 
happens. This, of course, would be a larger volume than if the industry 
knew that incandescent light bulbs would be barred or not. Though 
commenters were concerned that this regulation would cause 
environmental harm, the DOE rejected these concerns on the ground 
that it has not yet determined what the energy conservation standard 
will be.153 
It is hard to make sense of this analysis. The practical effect of the 
regulation was to allow incandescent light bulbs to be sold in 2020. A 
proper cost-benefit analysis would estimate the effects on the 
environment and compare them to the consumer surplus from sales of 
incandescent bulbs. Since this analysis has not been performed, we do 
not know whether withdrawal would be cost-justified.154 But the effect 
on inventory is a second-order concern, and the argument that the 
regulation has no environmental effect is disingenuous, because the 
DOE has not yet decided what a future conservation standard will be. 
The result of this deregulation will be that more incandescent light 
bulbs will be sold and used than would have been had the deregulation 
never occurred. If pretending otherwise is not arbitrary and capricious, 
we do not know what is. 
II. CHEVRONIZING AROUND COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 
The preceding examples demonstrate that CBA is not as 
malleable as some of its critics have contended.155 For its repeals of the 
Obama-era mercury regulation, the CPP, and fuel economy standards, 
the Trump EPA was able to massage some of the numbers at the 
margin, but could not bring itself to argue that the new mercury and 
CPP regulations were cost-justified. With respect to the repeal of the 
general service lamp standards and its initial CBA of the fuel economy 
standards, the Trump EPA did gin up phony CBAs, but their phoniness 
was plain to anyone who cared to examine them. 
 
 153. Id. at 46,670–71. 
 154. The Obama regulation did not include a cost-benefit analysis on the ground that the 
regulation was not a “major rule.” Energy Conservation Standards, supra note 147, at 7320.  
 155. See supra note 128. and accompanying text. 
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By way of contrast, it is notable that the Trump administration 
made most of its significant deregulatory inroads in areas where CBA 
has not traditionally been required, or in ways that are not normally 
subject to CBA. Thus, for example, the reduction of resources for 
enforcement is not subject to a cost-benefit requirement;156 nor is the 
reduction in reliance on scientific advisory boards.157 The withdrawal 
of regulations under the Congressional Review Act does not require a 
CBA.158 Similarly, the Federal Communications Commission was able 
to withdraw Obama’s net neutrality regulation without offering a 
CBA.159 The Trump administration’s recent revision of regulations for 
implementing the Endangered Species Act also involved a regulatory 
area in which agencies have not used cost-benefit analysis and are, in 
fact, prohibited by statute from taking economic considerations into 
account.160 And the administration’s immigration-related actions, 
including the withdrawal of the Deferred Action for Childhood 
Arrivals (“DACA”) program, generally did not require CBAs for 
various reasons. In the case of DACA, for example, cost-benefit 
 
 156. Alex Leary, Trump Administration Pushes To Deregulate with Less Enforcement, WALL 
ST. J. (June 23, 2019, 7:12 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/trump-administration-pushes-to-
deregulate-with-less-enforcement-11561291201 [https://perma.cc/FDD5-XTUC] (noting that 
Trump attempted to deregulate “by not hiring people to do the work of enforcing rules that are 
on the books”). 
 157. Jill Colvin, Trump Aims To Slash Number of Federal Advisory Committees, ASSOCIATED 
PRESS (June 14, 2019), https://apnews.com/4e36550332c74894b8b87f4ed51aafff [https://perma.cc/
45NX-98DT].  
 158. Under the Congressional Review Act (“CRA”), 5 U.S.C. §§ 801–08 (2018), Congress can 
overturn a proposed agency rule by a joint resolution of disapproval. Id. § 802. Congress does not 
need to justify its decision with cost-benefit analysis because the executive orders requiring CBA 
are not applicable to Congress. The 115th Congress (2017–2018) overturned sixteen rules under 
the CRA, whereas only one rule had previously been overturned since the law’s passage in 1996. 
MAEVE P. CAREY & CHRISTOPHER M. DAVIS, CONG. RSCH. SERV., THE CONGRESSIONAL 
REVIEW ACT (CRA) 1 (2018), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/IF10023.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y2UB-
HGFB]. 
 159. Historically, independent agencies such as the Federal Communications Commission 
have not been subject to the same CBA requirements as traditional executive branch agencies. 
According to one analysis, “E.O. 12866, like its predecessor orders that were issued by President 
Ronald Reagan (E.O. 12291 and E.O. 12498), does not apply the cost-benefit analysis or OIRA 
review to independent regulatory agencies such as the Federal Reserve Board and Securities and 
Exchange Commission.” MAEVE P. CAREY, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R43056, COUNTING 
REGULATIONS: AN OVERVIEW OF RULEMAKING, TYPES OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS 4 n.23 
(2019), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43056.pdf [https://perma.cc/WY6T-L8E5]. 
 160. Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Regulations for Listing Species and 
Designating Critical Habitat, 84 Fed. Reg. 45,020, 45,024–25 (Aug. 27, 2019) (to be codified at 50 
C.F.R. pt. 424). 
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analysis was not required because the administration merely 
abandoned the Obama administration’s decision not to enforce certain 
laws.161 Where CBA is required, the administration had to work around 
CBA rather than disregard it completely. CBA created tension with 
the Trump administration’s deregulatory goals. 
The Trump administration responded to this tension with a variety 
of tactics designed to evade or frustrate cost-benefit analysis. Some of 
these tactics were straightforward and relatively well understood. 
Others were innovations. The Sections that follow categorize these 
tactics and evaluate their legality. We conclude that most of them are 
illegal or should be held to be illegal. But cracking down on these 
actions would, in some cases, require courts to subject the Trump 
administration’s actions to a level of scrutiny that they have not 
traditionally been willing to apply to administrative action. 
In the cases of mercury, fuel economy, and the CPP, the 
administration tried to evade CBA rather than falsify it. Its strategies 
in these cases involved what this Article calls “Chevronizing around 
CBA”—using the executive branch’s authority over legal 
interpretations to evade or nullify the results of cost-benefit analysis. 
In the mercury case, the administration argued that while the Obama-
era mercury regulation generated benefits greater than the costs, some 
of those benefits—the co-benefits—did not count. These co-benefits 
did not count because the agency was legally prohibited from issuing a 
mercury regulation unless the mercury-related health benefits of the 
regulation alone exceeded the costs. Here, the agency’s argument was 
based on Chevron Step Two: the EPA argued that the statute was 
ambiguous, and thus the agency was entitled to deference in its 
interpretation excluding co-benefits. Similarly, the Trump 
administration justified its withdrawal of California’s Clean Air Act 
waiver with reference to its authority under Chevron Step Two and 
claimed that it was not even required to perform a cost-benefit analysis 
of its policy choice. In its repeal of the CPP, by contrast, the EPA 
operated at Chevron Step One: it argued that the statute 
unambiguously prohibited the agency from regulating in the manner 
dictated by the CPP, cost-benefit consequences notwithstanding. 
 
 161. The cost-benefit test of E.O. 12,866 applies to “regulatory actions,” Exec. Order No. 
12,866 § 6(a)(3), (a)(3)(C), 3 C.F.R. 638, 645–46 (1994), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. § 601 
(2018), defined as actions leading up to a final rule or regulation designed to have the effect of 
law, id. § 3(d)–(e). Thus, it does not apply to enforcement decisions. Cf. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. 
v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891, 1914 (2020) (noting that the Department of 
Homeland Security has “considerable flexibility in carrying out its responsibility”). 
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These two approaches are species of the same genus. In both cases, the 
agency used an interpretation of the Clean Air Act to escape the 
consequences of its cost-benefit analysis. Below, we analyze these two 
efforts in depth. 
A. Chevronizing Around Cost-Benefit Analysis at Step Two:  
The Cases of Mercury and Fuel Economy 
1. Mercury.  As we explained above, the section of the Clean Air 
Act under which the Obama EPA regulated mercury requires that 
regulation be “appropriate and necessary.”162 The Trump EPA argued 
that this language was ambiguous, that the EPA now interpreted the 
language to exclude consideration of co-benefits, and that the EPA’s 
interpretation was entitled to deference under Chevron Step Two.163 
This flavor of the Chevronizing strategy is potentially powerful 
because regulatory statutes are frequently ambiguous. This ambiguity 
creates interpretive space for the agency under Chevron, space that the 
agency can use to craft a legal interpretation that excludes benefits or 
costs. Still, an agency’s authority under Chevron is not limitless. Even 
if a statute is ambiguous, Step Two of the Chevron framework 
nonetheless requires that that the executive branch’s interpretation of 
ambiguous language be “reasonable.”164 
The meaning of this term has given rise to much scholarly debate. 
Some scholars have taken the position that Chevron’s two steps both 
call for statutory construction: Step One asks “whether the text of the 
agency’s governing statute nullifies the agency’s position,” while Step 
Two asks “whether other conventional tools of construction cast doubt 
on the agency’s position.”165 Others have suggested that Chevron Step 
Two calls for a more substantive type of review, possibly arbitrary and 
capricious review under the APA.166 This version of Chevron Step Two 
 
 162. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.  
 163. See supra notes 39–55 and accompanying text.  
 164. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984). 
 165. See Ronald M. Levin, The Anatomy of Chevron: Step Two Reconsidered, 72 CHI.-KENT 
L. REV. 1253, 1278–80 (1997); see also Kenneth A. Bamberger & Peter L. Strauss, Chevron’s Two 
Steps, 95 VA. L. REV. 611, 614 (2009); Peter L. Strauss, “Deference” Is Too Confusing—Let’s Call 
Them “Chevron Space” and “Skidmore Weight,” 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1143, 1162–65 (2012). 
 166. Mark Seidenfeld, A Syncopated Chevron: Emphasizing Reasoned Decisionmaking in 
Reviewing Agency Interpretations of Statutes, 73 TEX. L. REV. 83, 127, 130–31 (1994); Catherine 
M. Sharkey, Cutting in on the Chevron Two-Step, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 2359, 2384–85 (2018). 
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would direct a court to scrutinize the policy choices underlying the 
agency’s action, rather than merely engaging in a legalistic analysis of 
the agency’s statutory interpretation.167 Empirical studies of Chevron 
have shown that appellate courts subscribe to each of these 
interpretations at various times.168 
Here, if Chevron Step Two were given any sort of substantive 
content, we suspect that it would be fatal to the Trump EPA’s repeal 
of mercury regulations.169 That deregulation would create billions of 
 
Still other scholars have argued that Chevron has only one step, see generally Matthew C. 
Stephenson & Adrian Vermeule, Chevron Has Only One Step, 95 VA. L. REV. 597 (2009). 
 167. See Sharkey, supra note 166, at 2383–84.  
 168. Kent Barnett & Christopher J. Walker, Chevron in the Circuit Courts, 116 MICH. L. REV. 
1, 34–35 (2017); Richard M. Re, Should Chevron Have Two Steps?, 89 IND. L.J. 605, 638–40 
(2014). 
 169. It is worth noting that, across a wide variety of legal contexts, courts will sometimes treat 
the word “reasonable” as if it requires a comparison between costs and benefits. For examples 
from federal regulatory law, see 45 AM. JUR. 2d Job Discrimination §§ 200, 210 (2019) (stating 
that when determining whether an accommodation is reasonable under the Americans with 
Disabilities Act, “courts are permitted to take into account the reasonableness of the cost of any 
necessary workplace accommodation, the availability of alternatives therefor, or other 
appropriate relief in order to achieve an equitable and appropriate remedy,” and an employer 
does not need to provide an accommodation if doing so would be “unduly costly, extensive, 
substantial, or disruptive”); Am. Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 511 n.30 (1981) 
(discussing the requirement that the Consumer Product Safety Commission promulgate rules that 
are reasonably necessary to eliminate an “unreasonable risk” of injury require “a generalized 
balancing of costs and benefits”); 15 AM. JUR. 2d Civil Rights § 403 (2019) (“An accommodation 
is reasonable under the Fair Housing Act if it is both efficacious and proportional to the costs to 
implement it.”). For examples from tort law, see McCarty v. Pheasant Run, Inc., 826 F.2d 1554, 
1558 (7th Cir. 1987) (“Ordinarily the innkeeper knows much more about the hazards of his trade 
than the guest, and can take reasonable (=cost-justified) steps to reduce them, while ordinarily 
the guest can do little to protect himself against them.”); see also E. River S.S. Corp. v. 
Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 865 (1986); United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 
F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (L. Hand, J.); Md. Cas. Co. v. City of Jackson, 493 So. 2d 955, 960 n.3 
(Miss. 1986); People Express Airlines, Inc. v. Consol. Rail Corp., 100 N.J. 246, 266–67 
(1985); Micallef v. Miehle Co., 39 N.Y.2d 376, 386 (1976); FOWLER V. HARPER, FLEMING JAMES, 
JR., OSCAR S. GRAY, THE LAW OF TORTS 467–68 (2d ed. 1986); W. PAGE KEETON, DAN B. 
DOBBS, ROBERT E. KEETON & DAVID G. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF 
TORTS § 31 at 173 (5th ed. 1984). For examples from property law, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF TORTS § 826 (Am. L. Inst. 1975) (stating land use is unreasonable if “the gravity of the harm 
o[u]tweighs the utility of the actor’s conduct,” or if “the harm caused by the conduct is serious 
and the financial burden of compensating for this and similar harm to others would not make the 
continuation of the conduct [n]ot feasible”); Kopecky v. Nat’l Farms, Inc., 510 N.W.2d 41, 48 
(Neb. 1994) (holding that when a judge is unable to determine an invasion is unreasonable as a 
matter of law, the jury decides the question of reasonableness after weighing the gravity of harm 
against the utility of the actor’s conduct); 12 POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 79C.06 (2019) 
(stating that in the context of evaluating zoning changes, “courts have generally tried to balance 
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dollars in net costs and would create no identified nonmonetary benefit 
that might justify such a loss. That hardly seems reasonable, or, for that 
matter, “appropriate and necessary.” 
There is a related problem with the EPA’s interpretation that 
renders it unreasonable. Under the Trump administration’s view, the 
EPA is allowed to limit pollution that generates mercury-related harms 
and pollution that generates particulate matter-related harms, but it 
cannot count both harms when evaluating a regulation that does 
both.170 It is hard to think of a justification for such an approach, and 
the Trump administration did not supply one.  
The problem with the Trump EPA’s stance was that it could have 
compelled the agency to engage in unnecessarily wasteful regulation. 
Imagine that the EPA is considering a rule that limits emissions from 
factories. The anticipated rule imposes costs of $1 billion on businesses 
and results in lower emissions of two substances, X and Y. Suppose 
further that the X reduction produces benefits of $0.9 billion and the Y 
reduction produces benefits of $0.8 billion. The rule passes a cost-
benefit analysis because the joint benefits of $1.7 billion exceed the $1 
billion cost. 
Now, further suppose that two different laws authorize the EPA 
to regulate X and Y. Call these law-X and law-Y. Each law imposes 
different substantive standards. The EPA may regulate X only if 
“appropriate and necessary,” while the EPA may regulate Y only if 
regulation “serves the public interest.” Instead of issuing one 
regulation to reduce emissions of both X and Y, the EPA could issue 
separate regulations of X (under law-X) and Y (under law-Y). 
However, regulation-X alone would impose costs of $0.7 billion, and 
regulation-Y alone would impose costs of $0.6 billion, for a total of $1.3 
billion. It would thus be optimal for the EPA to regulate both 
chemicals with a single rule. 
Suppose a court held that the statutory language was ambiguous 
and the EPA deserved Chevron deference. The EPA then decided to 
interpret the statute to exclude co-benefits and bar the single 
regulation. Would a court hold that the EPA’s regulation was 
reasonable at Chevron Step Two? 
We are pretty sure the answer would be “no.” The standards 
“appropriate and necessary” and “the public interest” do not exclude 
 
the public gain from the particular provision against the private loss sustained by the property 
owner”). 
 170. See supra notes 44–55 and accompanying text.  
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considerations of co-benefits. On the contrary, they invite the agency 
to consider all relevant effects of the regulation. Excluding co-benefits 
from the analysis would push the agency toward inefficient alternatives 
and block regulations that would benefit public welfare. We do not 
think a court could reasonably interpret these standards to require the 
EPA to exclude co-benefits. Put more generally, it would seem 
unreasonable for an agency to select—as a matter of that agency’s 
discretion—a legal interpretation that compels the agency to act 
wastefully or inefficiently. Deliberately exercising agency discretion to 
achieve unnecessarily wasteful ends seems the antithesis of 
reasonableness. 
To test this intuition, let us consider some more extreme cases. 
Imagine that the EPA regulates under law-X and the co-benefit is now 
something over which the EPA has no authority. Let us imagine that 
the EPA could prove the co-benefit is reducing violent crime. The 
regulated industry argues that the EPA cannot take this co-benefit into 
account and therefore, the regulation should be struck down because 
the costs exceed the authorized benefits. 
The industry is wrong. The EPA should consider reductions in 
violent crime—or, more precisely, reductions in deaths, injuries, and 
property loss—as long as a causal relationship between the emissions 
and violent crime can be established. The goal of regulation should be 
to increase overall social welfare. This requires analyzing all of the 
effects of a regulation, not merely the intended effects or those 
specifically named by the statute. 
Imagine, for example, that the regulation produces costs rather 
than benefits—a “co-cost”—by, for example, increasing violent crime. 
The EPA would be on firm ground if it put the relevant outcomes into 
a cost-benefit analysis. The issue is not whether the regulation 
produces benefits or costs by affecting behavior that the underlying 
statute did not seek to influence; the issue is whether the benefits and 
costs are actually borne by the relevant group of people and borne in a 
way that is clear and measurable. 
This last point is worth emphasizing. Virtually all regulations 
affect behaviors across many dimensions. A pollution-control 
regulation will typically reduce many types of emissions, not just one.171 
It would be strange for the agency to ignore the effects of other types 
of emissions—good or bad—just because the agency acts pursuant to a 
 
 171. See supra Part I.B (discussing the various reductions in pollutants from the Clean Power 
Plan). 
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statute that regulates only the one emission type. The same regulation 
could, by increasing the cost of goods produced by the factory, have a 
range of other effects—on the safety of products built with the factory’s 
inputs, on employment, or on working conditions in the factory. 
Similarly, regulation of fuel economy standards can affect the amount 
of fuel consumed and the price of automobiles, but will also affect 
pollution, traffic fatalities, and more. These effects are unavoidable, so 
if the agency is not allowed to take them into account, its regulations 
will often cause great harm. Indeed, the vast majority of costs and 
benefits that figured into the Trump administration’s CBA of its fuel 
economy standards are actually co-costs and co-benefits: increased or 
reduced traffic fatalities, environmental harms, and so forth.172 Yet the 
Trump administration continued to consider co-costs and co-benefits 
in this context without any recognition that it was acting inconsistently 
with its approach to mercury. 
In its defense of the mercury regulation repeal, the Trump EPA 
hedged a bit by suggesting a more restricted version of its rule against 
considering co-benefits. It argued that the problem with the mercury 
regulation was that the “primary” benefit was the reduction of non-
mercury emissions.173 We can see the force of this argument by 
considering a semi-hypothetical example. Imagine that the EPA wants 
to reduce cigarette smoking because of its public health effects and so 
issues an environmental regulation that limits how much cigarette 
smoke a person may produce. Then the EPA conducts a cost-benefit 
analysis in which it finds that virtually all the benefits come from 
preventing the deaths of smokers themselves rather than from second-
hand smoke “pollution” caused by their “emissions.” It is evident that 
the agency is trying to regulate in a way outside its authority—which 
here belongs to the Food and Drug Administration. A fair 
interpretation of the authorizing statutes suggests that the EPA may 
not regulate cigarette smoking, and it cannot avoid this restriction by 
purporting to regulate smoke emissions. 
One can imagine a similar argument even when an agency issues 
rules that affect outcomes within its authority. Imagine that Congress 
tells the EPA to regulate mercury emissions strictly, but to regulate 
particulate matter emissions with a light touch. The EPA then issues a 
regulation that strictly regulates both types of emissions and justifies 
the regulation with a cost-benefit analysis in which the effects on 
 
 172. See supra Part I.C.1. 
 173. See supra notes 54–55 and accompanying text.  
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particulate matter play the dominant role. Here, an argument could be 
made that the EPA acted improperly. But the actual mercury rule 
presents the opposite scenario. The standard for regulating particulate 
matter emissions is what is “requisite to protect the public health.”174 
The Supreme Court has held that this requires the EPA to regulate 
particulate matter emissions without regard to cost175—which is to say, 
even more stringently than it regulates mercury.176 On these terms, 
then, the EPA’s choice is quite proper.  
It is important to emphasize that if this provision of the Clean Air 
Act unambiguously barred consideration of co-benefits, then the EPA 
would be obligated, at Chevron Step One, not to consider them in its 
regulatory decisions. This is the position the Trump EPA took with 
respect to the CPP, which we discuss below. But this was not the Trump 
EPA’s view of the statute authorizing it to regulate mercury, and we 
suspect it is highly unlikely that a court would ever hold that 
“appropriate and necessary” unambiguously sbars consideration of co-
benefits.177 Here, the Trump EPA’s refusal to take co-benefits into 
account was the agency’s own choice—an exercise of the agency’s 
policy discretion. The agency deliberately selected an interpretation 
that would force it to create more costs than benefits. Such an attempt 
to Chevronize around cost-benefit analysis should not be deemed 
“reasonable.” 
2. Fuel Economy.  The EPA and NHTSA’s claims to Chevron 
deference in withdrawing California’s Clean Air Act waiver raise 
different issues. Consider first the EPA’s argument that California did 
not face “compelling and extraordinary conditions” that necessitate a 
waiver.178 The EPA argued that “the term ‘extraordinary’ should refer 
to circumstances that are specific to California.”179 “Extraordinary” 
means “going beyond what is usual, regular, or customary,” or 
 
 174. 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (2018). 
 175. Whitman v. Am. Trucking, 531 U.S. 457, 466–67 (2001). 
 176. Michigan v. EPA, 576 U.S. 743, 756 (2015) (“‘Appropriate and necessary’ is a far more 
comprehensive criterion than ‘requisite to protect the public health’; read fairly and in context, as 
we have explained, the term plainly subsumes consideration of cost.”). 
 177. In another case, the D.C. Circuit approved the EPA’s reliance on co-benefits. See U.S. 
Sugar Corp. v. EPA, 830 F.3d 579, 625 (D.C. Cir. 2016). If the Obama EPA exercised its discretion 
properly to consider co-benefits, then the Trump EPA’s reversal, without any explanation based 
on policy considerations, seems arbitrary. 
 178. 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b)(1)(B). 
 179. SAFE One National Program Rule, supra note 135, at 51,341. 
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“exceptional,”180 and the statute is specifically meant to allow waivers 
for particular states while excluding others.181 Accordingly, the Trump 
EPA’s interpretation of the statute appears reasonable at minimum, 
and it is perhaps even the best interpretation of the statute. 
What is more dubious was the EPA’s claim that “while effects 
related to climate change in California could be substantial, they are 
not sufficiently different from the conditions in the nation as a whole 
to justify separate State standards.”182 California is certainly not the 
only state to have been affected by climate change. But it has been 
affected in a manner—including the outbreak of vast wildfires, 
accompanied by power blackouts meant to reduce the incidence of 
such fires, among other things—that is different and arguably more 
severe than most other states.183 Even though the EPA is entitled to 
Chevron deference as to its interpretation of the Clean Air Act, its 
conclusion that California does not meet the terms of the statute is 
subject to arbitrary and capricious review under the APA.184 As we 
have noted, arbitrary and capricious review is often—though not 
always—quite limited.185 But if a court conducts a more searching 
inquiry, we suspect that the EPA’s determination is unlikely to survive. 
With respect to the conflict between the Clean Air Act and the 
Energy Policy and Conservation Act, the outcome is equally uncertain. 
The Energy Policy and Conservation Act explicitly requires NHTSA 
to consider “the effect of other motor vehicle standards of the 
Government on fuel economy” when setting fuel economy 
standards.186 Courts have held that when the EPA grants California a 
preemption waiver, this waiver effectively transforms California’s fuel 
economy standards into federal standards and requires that NHTSA 
 
 180. Extraordinary, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY ONLINE, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/extraordinary [https://perma.cc/G48V-28GK]. 
 181. 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b). 
 182. SAFE One National Program Rule, supra note 135, at 51,344. 
 183. The Climate Connection to California’s Wildfires, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 27, 2020), https://
nyti.ms/2DLpT4I [https://perma.cc/Z5NR-TUF9].  
 184. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2018).  
 185. Compare Gersen & Vermeule, supra note 122, at 1358, 1362 (finding that the 
overwhelming majority of agency decisions survive “arbitrary and capricious” challenges at the 
Supreme Court), with Cecot & Viscusi, supra note 121, at 590–603 (finding higher rates of reversal 
in the lower courts than Gersen & Vermeule). 
 186. 49 U.S.C. § 32902(f) (2018). 
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take them into account.187 It was on this basis that two federal courts 
held that the Energy Policy and Conservation Act does not preempt 
states from promulgating fuel economy regulations pursuant to an 
EPA waiver.188 Once California has obtained an EPA waiver, its 
standards have the status of federal regulations, and the Energy Policy 
and Conservation Act cannot block them.  
Of course, these cases were decided in the presence of federal 
agencies that were favorably inclined toward the state regulations at 
issue. The federal government was not a party to either lawsuit, and 
the courts did not refer to Chevron deference or the agencies’ position. 
But it is nonetheless entirely possible that those cases could have come 
out differently had the courts been required to defer to reasonable 
agency constructions of the statutes. That, in turn, again raises the 
question of whether an agency interpretation of a statute can be 
reasonable under Chevron Step Two if it compels the agency to take 
an action that is not cost-benefit justified. An honest cost-benefit 
analysis, had the EPA and NHTSA been required to produce one, 
would likely show that denying California a Clean Air Act waiver 
created costs in excess of benefits. Indeed, that is what a (more) honest 
cost-benefit analysis of the Trump administration’s fuel economy 
standards demonstrated. Yet here, because no cost-benefit analysis 
was produced, it would be challenging for a court to puncture the EPA 
and NHTSA’s result. It is thus possible that the withdrawal of 
California’s waiver would survive a court challenge. 
B. Chevronizing Around Cost-Benefit Analysis at Step One:  
The Clean Power Plan 
As with its approach to repealing the mercury regulation, the 
Trump administration’s strategy with regard to repealing the CPP 
represented a type of Chevronizing around CBA. Here, too, the 
administration was faced with an unfavorable CBA. However much it 
attempted to massage the numbers, its analysis revealed that repealing 
the CPP would create huge net costs and lead to many unnecessary 
 
 187. Cent. Valley Chrysler-Jeep, Inc. v. Goldstene, 529 F. Supp. 2d 1151, 1168–69, 1172 (E.D. 
Cal. 2007).  
 188. Id. at 1172; Green Mountain Chrysler v. Crombie, 508 F. Supp. 2d 295, 348–50 (D. Vt. 
2007). The courts held, in the alternative, that the Energy Policy Conservation Act’s preemption 
provision should be read very narrowly, and that it did not preempt the state fuel economy 
standards. Goldstene, 529 F. Supp. 2d at 1174–75; Crombie, 508 F. Supp. 2d at 330–35.  
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deaths.189 In response, the Trump EPA took the position that its hands 
were tied—the Clean Air Act allowed only regulations that could be 
applied to a single power plant and did not allow regulation of the 
overall mixture of fuel sources used in a state.190 In advancing this 
argument, the EPA did not claim that it was entitled to deference 
under Chevron. Instead, it argued that the statute unambiguously 
prohibited regulation of the type employed in the CPP.191 
On its own terms, this is a dubious conclusion. Recall that the 
Clean Air Act requires the EPA to implement the “best system of 
emission reduction.”192 The word “system” is amenable to a wide 
variety of interpretations.193 The standard definition of the word would 
include large-scale plans favoring some types of energy production 
over others.194 In addition, the Clean Air Act never states explicitly that 
the only permissible standards are those that can be applied within 
boundaries of each regulated source. The Trump EPA inferred this 
from the words “existing source” and “application,”195 but that is not 
the only reasonable interpretation of those words, particularly when 
they are read in context with the phrase “system of emission 
reduction.” 
Nonetheless, one can see why the Trump EPA adopted this legal 
strategy. This version of Chevronizing around CBA at Step One—if it 
were upheld by the courts—would have served three overlapping 
purposes for the Trump administration. First, it would have justified 
the agency’s decision to repeal the CPP, despite the fact that the CPP 
creates benefits well in excess of costs. It would also have insulated the 
repeal decision from arbitrary and capricious review under the APA—
if the CPP was unlawful, it could not be arbitrary and capricious to 
 
 189. See supra notes 78–80 and accompanying text. 
 190. Repeal of Clean Power Plan, supra note 68, at 32,556; see also supra notes 81–87 and 
accompanying text. 
 191. Repeal of Clean Power Plan, supra note 68, at 32,527 (“After reconsidering the relevant 
statutory text, structure, and purpose, the Agency now recognizes that Congress ‘spoke to the 
precise question’ of the scope of CAA section 111(a)(1) and clearly precluded the unsupportable 
reading of that provision asserted in the CPP. Accordingly, this action repeals the CPP.”); see also 
supra notes 88–89 and accompanying text. 
 192. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(1) (2018). 
 193. Repeal of Clean Power Plan, supra note 68, at 32,528. 
 194. See System, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/system [https://perma.cc/P57K-WQ6C] (defining “system” as “a 
regularly interacting or interdependent group of items forming a unified whole”). 
 195. Repeal of Clean Power Plan, supra note 68, at 32,523.  
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repeal it. Second, it would bind the hands of any future EPA, operating 
under a different president, that might attempt to reinstate the CPP. If 
the Clean Air Act is unambiguous, the views of any given EPA as to 
the statute’s meaning are irrelevant.196 Third, this approach would not 
have required the EPA to argue that the statute is ambiguous and that 
its interpretation—which would generate greater costs than benefits—
is reasonable. As we suggested in the prior Section, courts may be 
reluctant to accept as reasonable a discretionary interpretation that 
produces costs in excess of benefits and forecloses the most efficient 
options.197 Here, the EPA attempted to escape that bind by arguing 
that it possesses no interpretive discretion.198 
Arguing that an interpretation is permitted under Chevron, as in 
the case of mercury, creates different types of legal risks than arguing 
that an interpretation is mandated by an unambiguous statute, as with 
the CPP.199 But in both cases, an agency that does not have a strong 
argument on policy grounds for repealing existing regulations has 
resorted to legal interpretation as a mechanism for evading CBA. 
CONCLUSION 
The Trump administration’s deregulatory project exposed some 
serious tensions in the structure of the administrative state. On the one 
hand, a tradition of judicial deference to the executive, exemplified by 
the Chevron doctrine, suggests that when the governing statute is 
ambiguous, courts will—or should—give Trump a free hand to roll 
back regulation. Congress gave the president discretion over policy, 
and the question whether to regulate or deregulate falls within that 
policy discretion. Courts should therefore defer to the president’s 
 
 196. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984) (“If the 
intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must 
give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”). 
 197. See supra Part II.A.1. 
 198. Repeal of Clean Power Plan, supra note 68, at 32,523 (“The text of the CAA is 
inconsistent with that interpretation, and the context, structure, and legislative history confirm 
that the statutory interpretation underlying the CPP was not a permissible construction of the 
Act.”). 
 199. It is possible that, in the course of litigation, the Trump EPA might have attempted to 
argue in the alternative that it was entitled to Chevron deference in the event that a court viewed 
the language of the Clean Air Act as ambiguous. However, this line of argument would likely 
have been foreclosed by the Chenery doctrine, which does not permit agencies to rely upon 
arguments or justifications that were not offered at the time a regulation was promulgated. See 
Amy R. Motomura, Rethinking Administrative Law’s Chenery Doctrine: Lessons from Patent 
Appeals at the Federal Circuit, 53 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 817, 822–23 (2014).  
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policy judgments. On the other hand, the rise of cost-benefit analysis 
suggests that courts should push back against the executive branch 
when its regulatory decisions violate a cost-benefit test, even if the 
relevant statutory language is broad and ambiguous. The president’s 
choice to regulate or deregulate any particular industry is therefore 
constrained by facts about the world—people’s preferences and the 
costs of regulatory compliance—which the president is required to 
respect. 
We see three ways to resolve this tension. First, one could grab the 
Chevron horn of the dilemma and argue that in the presence of an 
ambiguous statute, the executive branch can do what it wants, cost-
benefit analysis notwithstanding. Indeed, the cost-benefit requirement 
itself began as an initiative by the executive branch and was only later 
enforced by courts. And even then, it was enforced only sporadically.200 
The Trump administration could have argued that what the president 
giveth, the president may taketh away. But at minimum, this window 
of discretion appears to be narrowing. Courts have increasingly found 
an unambiguous cost-benefit requirement in the statutory language 
that agencies are required to enforce.201 If this trend continues, 
executive discretion will further erode. We suspect that the sloppy cost-
benefit analyses used by the Trump administration would be rejected 
by the courts as arbitrary and capricious, further strengthening this 
emerging cost-benefit norm. 
Second, one could go the other direction and argue that executive 
branch administrative discretion is a myth or, at least, is becoming one. 
Even where statutory language is ambiguous, the executive branch 
must comply with cost-benefit analysis, or perhaps even try to 
maximize social welfare. Courts will push back if the branch does not. 
 
 200. See, e.g., Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1148–56 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Corrosion-
Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201, 1218–23 (5th Cir. 1991). See generally Jonathan S. Masur & 
Eric A. Posner, Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Judicial Role, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 935 (2018) 
[hereinafter Masur & Posner, Judicial Role] (discussing judicial review of agencies’ defective cost-
benefit analyses for regulations). 
 201. See Michigan v. EPA, 576 U.S. 743, 749 (2015) (“The statute expressly requires the 
Agency to consider cost (alongside other specified factors) when imposing beyond-the-floor 
standards.”); Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1148–49 (setting aside a Securities and Exchange 
Commission action under the APA for “inconsistently and opportunistically fram[ing] the costs 
and benefits of the rule”); Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Arbitrariness Review, 41 
HARV. ENV’T L. REV. 1, 11–13 (2017) (describing why some judges may favor cost-benefit 
balancing as a check on administrative agencies while others may avoid it because they are not 
well trained in resolving empirical issues). 
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But this view raises numerous difficult and familiar questions. Do the 
courts have the capacity to second-guess the judgments of experts in 
regulatory agencies?202 Many such judgments involve technical 
questions, including, for example, which of a number of conflicting 
studies is most credible and how valuations should be extrapolated 
from limited data. Courts are notoriously skittish, probably for good 
reason, about overruling the executive’s judgment with regard to 
technical issues over which the courts have substantially less expertise, 
even though technical analyses can be misused to support politically 
preferred outcomes.  
Third, there may be a middle way. One possibility is that the 
executive branch’s discretion is at a maximum when it chooses whether 
to regulate and how much, and at a minimum when it seeks to eliminate 
or curtail existing regulations. Consider, for example, the choice 
whether to issue a strict regulation or a moderate regulation. Imagine 
that both regulations pass a cost-benefit analysis in the sense of being 
preferable to the status quo, but they generate different wealth levels 
and perhaps distributional consequences and involve different levels of 
uncertainty about consequences. Under existing law, a court is likely 
to defer to the executive’s choice, and this may well be the proper 
approach. By contrast, if the executive seeks to replace an earlier 
modest regulation with a strict regulation, or a strict regulation with a 
modest regulation or no regulation at all, a court should be more likely 
to insist that the revision be cost justified.203 Experience with the status 
quo regulation, and the economic analysis and related materials that 
the government had used to justify the regulation, might give a court 
the information it needs to review the regulatory reform. 
Whatever the preferred solution, our main point is that when a 
statute neither unambiguously permits or prohibits cost-benefit 
analysis, the tradition of Chevron deference and the emerging cost-
benefit norm are in tension—and one will have to give. The Trump 
administration laid this contradiction bare by so obviously trying to use 
Chevron to evade cost-benefit analysis, and now courts may have to 
decide what to do. The tension reflects an underlying theoretical 
 
 202. See generally Masur & Posner, Judicial Role, supra note 200 (discussing judicial review 
of agencies’ defective cost-benefit analyses for regulations); see also cases cited in supra note 200. 
 203. This would involve a change to existing law, under which the Supreme Court has typically 
required the same degree of explanation from an agency for a regulatory change, or deregulation, 
as it has for an agency’s original regulation. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 
514 (2009). 
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uncertainty about how much discretion the executive should have over 
public policy, whether courts should curtail that discretion, and, if so, 
to what degree. This tension is also reflected in the efforts by 
commentators and some judges to revive the nondelegation doctrine, 
which would require Congress to curtail the discretion of the executive 
by engaging in regulation itself rather than delegating regulatory 
authority to agencies.204 The problem with the nondelegation doctrine 
is that it imposes a burden on Congress for which it lacks institutional 
capacity, due to the highly complex and ever-changing challenges of 
regulation.205 A cost-benefit norm that constrains the executive without 
imposing new burdens on Congress may be the solution to this 
problem. 
 
 204. See Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2123–24 (2019) (describing the limits of 
Congress’s power to delegate to agencies). 
 205. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST-BENEFIT REVOLUTION 27–38 (2018) (explaining the 
rationale from expertise for delegating substantial authority to agencies). 
